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# CRITICISMS

ON

# The DIVERSIONS of PURLEY, &c.

[Price Two Shillings.]

# CRITICISMS

ON

# The DIVERSIONS of PURLEY.

IN A

# LETTER

TO

# HORNE TOOKE, Esq.

---

BY I. CASSANDER.

The Revd John Bruckner - Minister of the Walloon Church at Norwich, and afterwards of the Dutch - from 1783 till his death, 12 May 1801

NUGAS AGIT, SED QUÆ AD SERIA DUCUNT.

ERASMUS, Ep. Lib. iv. Ep. 7.

Born in the Island of Cadsand 1746

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LONDON:

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M DCC XC.

BRITISH MUSEUM

# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE remarks contained in the following letter were written three years ago, and merely for the inſpection of a few friends, who had expreſſed a deſire of ſeeing the Author's ſentiments concerning the Diverſions of Purley. This work having been adopted ſince by many as a proper guide to Engliſh literature, it is preſumed, that the remarks upon it by a writer, who aims at nothing but a fair repreſentation of truth, will not be unacceptable to the Publick. It is pity, indeed, that a performance, in other reſpects valuable, and well calculated to open the eyes of the learner with regard to falſe ſyſtems, ſhould remain in its preſent ſtate, and not be rendered as perfect as the nature of the ſubject will permit.

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# ERRATA.

| PAG. | LINE. | FOR, | READ. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 22 | ſor | for. |
| 13 | 26 | concerns | concern. |
| 30 | 19 | deſortoque | deſorteque. |
| 31 | 6 | noits | not its. |
| 39 | 6 | onleȝon | onléȝan. |
| 48 | 21 | aȝculan | aȝcuȝan. |
| Ibid. | — | aȝleaȝan | aȝlean. |
| 49 | 1 | uȝaȝtéan | uȝaȝlean. |
| 51 | 9 | Adeling | Adelung. |
| 54 | 12 | Light | Lite. |
| 57 | 22 | Butan | Botan. |
| 58 | 2 | Penanee | Penance. |
| Ibid. | 21 | halbe | balbe. |
| 59 | 14 and 17 | Butan | Botan. |
| 64 | 26 | engaarn | ongaarn. |
| 70 | 1 | theis | this. |
| 72 | 15 | hpyle | hpýlé. |
| 74 | 21 | Spik-ſpelder | Spik-ſpëlder. |

26 JY60

A

# LETTER, &c.

SIR,

THE theory of language is a career in which, from the time of Ariſtotle down to the preſent, many an adventurer has run himſelf out of breath; ſpent himſelf with fatigue, without the applauſe, or even the notice, of the ſpectators. You have had better luck. No ſooner have you entered the liſt, but the eyes of all have been fixed upon you; and great have been the acclamations at the ſkill and vigor with which you have been obſerved to ſet out.

Your remarks on the diſtribution of language and nature of particles, publiſhed ſome years ago in a letter to Mr. Dunning, and lately republiſhed in your Diverſions of Purley, have excited a general curioſity. Your thoughts are ſo new, your manner is ſo

ſhort, ſo bold, ſo expeditious, that it is difficult to ſay which has occaſioned moſt ſurpriſe.

It muſt not be diſſembled, however, that in ſome of your pages you have betrayed a very ſtrong propenſion towards inaccuracy. Unleſs you can get the better of this failing, much of the luſtre which awaits your future publication may be obſcured by it.

The purpoſe of this letter, Sir, is to put you, if poſſible, upon your guard againſt it. The few hints you have given us may, when cleared of the rubbiſh which ſurrounds them, produce ſome good; but no deſirable effect can reſult from them in the ſtate they are in at preſent. I ſhall make no other apology for the freedom of this addreſs.

Before I enter upon more important matters, I muſt not leave unnoticed your title-page and introduction in your laſt-mentioned performance.

An elegant and moſt amiable writer has the following obſervation on the monuments which are to be ſeen in Weſtminſter Abbey: "And ſome of them "are ſo modeſt, that they deliver what they have to "ſay in Greek and Hebrew, and by that means are "not underſtood once in a twelve-month *." How far you were influenced by theſe feelings, when to an Engliſh performance you prefixed a Greek title, and how far, after having been the miſerable victim of two prepoſitions and a conjunction †, you are

* Addiſon in the Spectator.

† All I have to ſay upon this ſubject has been among the looſe papers in my cloſet, and would probably have remained there twenty years longer, had I not been made the miſerable victim of two prepoſitions and a conjunction. Div. of Purley, p. 102.

likely

likely to ſuffer from an exceſs of modeſty, I ſhall not take upon me to determine: but with regard to title-pages, I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that they are never ſo pleaſing as when they are intelligible; and wonder much how, after having expreſſed ſo much horror at Mr. Harris's and Lord Monboddo's zoophytes *, that is, "words ſignificant without any ſig-"nification," you could have the courage of placing a brace of theſe monſters † in your work, by way of frontiſpiece.

With regard to your introduction, I muſt confeſs, that though I have met there with a variety of converſation, on a variety of very pleaſant ſubjects, ſuch as "Effuſion of Blood, Total Diſmemberment of the "Empire, Smoak of London, Boots, Picquet," &c. I have not been particularly ſtruck with it, except where you introduce one of the champions for intolerance, delivering the following maxim, "Whatever "is wavering, involved, ambiguous, muſt of courſe "be falſe and fraudulent." This piece of ſophiſtry, originally levelled at the Proteſtant churches, you take up eagerly, and fling it with ſome violence in the face of the writer of Hermes, calling out to him with an air of triumph, "I have it from good autho-"rity." That this writer deſerves to be chaſtiſed, may be true; but that it can be effected with a piece

* Mr. Harris afterwards acknowledges that ſome of them have a kind of obſcure ſignification—and appear in Grammar like zoophytes in nature, a kind of middle being of amphibious character," &c. Ibid. p. 155 and 160.

† Επια πτιροντα, or Diverſions of Purley; neither of which can give the reader the leaſt idea of the ſubject in queſtion.

of a broken ſyllogiſm borrowed from Monſ. De Meaux, is by no means probable: and how you come to have recourſe to ſuch an expedient is wonderful; unleſs indeed you were determined not only to chaſtiſe him, but to make his chaſtiſement as ignominious as poſſible. For what can be more degrading than to be put to a nonplus with ſuch arguments? It is as bad as being brained with a lady's fan *. Thus much for your title-page and introduction. I go over to the work itſelf.

† As Grammar is one of the firſt arts which probably engaged the attention of the curious, does it not ſeem extraordinary that the diviſion and diſtribution of language ſhould remain even to this day ſo imperfect as not to anſwer the purpoſe for which it was contrived? And yet ſo it is. Inſtead of pointing out, in a clear and diſtinct manner, the difference of words, it may be ſaid, that, in many inſtances, it ſerves only to confound them. In vain, to remedy this defect, have Grammarians added to the number of their claſſes. They have always found ſome words ſo refractory as not to be reducible to any pre-eſtabliſhed claſs whatever; a circumſtance which has increaſed the labour of the learner, without any additional advantage. I muſt therefore do you the juſtice to ſay, that ſome praiſe is your due for having taken this ſubject into conſideration, and employed ſo much

* That the conjunction THAT, and the prepoſition OF and CONCERNING, ſhould be made the abject inſtruments of my civil extinction, appeared to me to make my exit from civil life as degrading as if I had been brained by a lady's fan. Diverſ. of Purley, p. 103.

of your leiſure upon it. The point of view in which you have placed it is, upon the whole, well-calculated to bring within the reach of ſolution ſome of the difficulties with which it is ſurrounded.

I ſpeak with reſtriction, becauſe there is a reaſon for it. If in ſome inſtances you have cleared the ground, you have added to its embarraſſments in others, by being too forward in conjecture, too haſty in deciſion, too apt to diſplace what is right, and to ſubſtitute what is not ſo in the room of it. You have not given, in ſhort, your ſyſtem the conſiſtency and ſolidity of which it is ſuſceptible, and which you were very able to give it, had you been willing to beſtow a little more thought upon it. Much of its credit depends upon neat and eaſy deductions with regard to particles; but, more intent upon the number than juſtneſs and propriety of them, your deductions are heaped together without the leaſt diſcrimination; and ſuffered, for the moſt part, to make their appearance before they are fit to be ſeen, "horridulæ & incomptæ," as the Latins term it. I muſt not, however, allow myſelf the liberty of ſuch remarks without proving them to be juſt; and this will be done in the following pages.

In your firſt chapter, which treats of the diſtribution or diviſion of language, you condemn Grammarians, both ancient and modern, for having ſuppoſed that the difference of words may be accounted for merely from the well-known principle, that language was contrived for the purpoſe of communicating thought. You ſhew the deficiency of this principle; and, after a few hints on the means of

rendering it more complete, you ſtrike out a new diviſion of language; having, as you ſuppoſe, all the advantages of the old one, without any of its defects. The remarks which I have made on this chapter will ſhew the contrary.

Whether words are conſidered as the ſigns of things, or ideas, or operations of the mind; if it be ſuppoſed, as has been done hitherto, that the ſame word may ſerve to repreſent two different things or ideas; it is impoſſible that the diviſion ariſing from the above-mentioned principle ſhould anſwer the purpoſe, and for this plain reaſon, becauſe one and the ſame word muſt in that caſe neceſſarily belong to two different claſſes.

Had you been ſo fortunate as to view your ſubject in this light, and in no other, ſome advantage might have been gained. Your chapter on the diviſion and diſtribution of language would have been ſhorter, and, what is of more importance, your new diviſion would have been more complete. For want of having, when you planned it, kept your eye fixed on the above-mentioned circumſtance, you miſſed your aim, as others did before you; and the very ſame miſtakes and inconveniences, which we have to encounter in the old diviſion, diſtreſs us with additional force in your new one.

You do not indeed ſet out from the principle, that there muſt be as many different ſorts of words as there are different ſorts of things, or ideas, or operations of the mind. But you build on a foundation altogether as looſe and precarious, namely, the uſe or deſtination of words.

*The*

*The first aim of language*, you say, *was to communicate our thoughts; the second to do it with dispatch* *. And as this principle is two-fold, it leads you, naturally enough, to suppose two sorts of words in language: 1. Words necessary for the communication of our thoughts; 2. Words necessary for the dispatch of that communication †.

I shall not here oppose your two-fold principle concerning the use of language; I shall only take notice of your inference from it. Because language is destined to communicate thoughts, and to communicate them with dispatch, does it follow that there are two distinct and separate orders of words, the one necessary for communication, the other necessary for the dispatch of that business? By no means. One and the same word may happen to answer equally well both purposes. And upon recollection we shall find this not only possible, but actually taking place with regard to a great number of words in every language. If we set out therefore from your principle, *the destination of words*, in order to establish a proper division of them, it will not discriminate them any more than their relation, either to things, or ideas, or operations of the mind. The same words will frequently partake of two different classes; and the new contrivance will leave them as indistinct and confused as ever.

Experience wonderfully confirms the truth of these remarks. Words are divided by you into, 1. *Words necessary for the communication of thought*; 2. *Words*

* P. 37. † P. 63.

 *necessary*

*neceſſary for the diſpatch of that communication.* Theſe are your two grand claſſes; and, provided they do keep the words ſeparate and diſtinct, ſo that no word deemed neceſſary for communication be deemed alſo neceſſary for the diſpatch of that buſineſs, they may remain as they are. But in your firſt claſs are compriſed the nouns in general *; and among theſe are the general terms; and the general terms, from your own †, as well as Mr. Locke's definition, are to all intents and purpoſes abbreviations; and abbreviations are every one of them neceſſary for the diſpatch of communication.

Again: in your ſecond claſs are compriſed articles, prepoſitions, conjunctions, all parts of ſpeech, in ſhort, which do not come under the denomination either of noun or verb, from which they are diſcriminated by the general title of abbreviations or ſubſtitutes, which you give them. But it is generally believed, and we ſhall have occaſion to prove in the courſe of theſe remarks, that among the various words which conſtitute a language, and which are neceſſary for communication, none poſſeſs this laſt-mentioned property in a more ſtriking manner than thoſe which you rank under the title of abbreviations, that is, prepoſitions, conjunctions, articles.

You tell us indeed, and that in more than one

* In Engliſh, and in all other languages, there are only two ſorts of words which are neceſſary for the communication of thought: and they are, 1, Noun; 2, Verb. Diverſ. of Purley, p. 65.

† Ibid. p. 39.

inſtance,

inſtance, they do not poſſeſs it* : you go even ſo far as to try to juggle us into the belief of this paradox.

In your third chapter you roundly aſſert, and ſeem to plume yourſelf on the aſſertion, that without uſing any other ſorts of words whatever, and merely by means of the noun and the verb, one can relate or communicate any thing that can be communicated and related by the help of all the others †. And here you challenge us to try the experiment. You are not one of thoſe, however, who can withſtand the force of truth for ever. Soon after this aſſertion you make ample amends for the boldneſs of it. You acknowledge the article to be at once an abbreviation, and a word neceſſary for communication ‡; and you

* I am inclined to allow that rank only (viz. of parts of ſpeech) to the neceſſary words; and to include all the others (which are not neceſſary to ſpeech, but merely ſubſtitutes of the firſt ſort) under the title of abbreviations. Diverſ. of Purley, p. 65. *And again:* Whereas abbreviations are not neceſſary for communication. Ibid. p. 96.

† B. Merely ſubſtitutes! You do not mean that you can diſcourſe as well without as with them?

H. Not as well. A ſledge cannot be drawn along as ſmoothly, and eaſily, and ſwiftly, as a carriage with wheels: but it may be dragged.

B. Do you mean then, that without uſing any other ſort of word whatever, and merely by means of the noun and the verb, you can relate or communicate any thing that I can relate or communicate with the help of all the others?

H. Yes: it is the great proof of all I have advanced; and upon trial you will find that you may do the ſame. Diverſ. of Purley, p. 67.

‡ The fate of this very neceſſary word has been ſingularly hard; for

you quote Mr. Locke for the further confirmation of this truth.

Theſe are ugly circumſtances attending your new diviſion of language; and it were greatly to be wiſhed you could think of ſomething leſs repugnant to common ſenſe than words neceſſary, and words not neceſſary, for communication. You will ſay, indeed, the latter are only ſuppoſed to be ſo for the purpoſe of keeping them ſeparate from the others. But the anſwer is obvious. If we are allowed to make ſuppoſitions in matters of this nature, why ſhould we lay aſide the old ſyſtem? It will do very well. *It is only ſuppoſing an imaginary operation or two,* as occaſion requires.

But this is not all. You compare abbreviations to thoſe parts of a carriage which have been contrived for eaſe, ornament, and luxury; and repreſent them, notwithſtanding, as having no connexion with what

for though, without it, the article, or ſome equivalent invention, MEN COULD NOT COMMUNICATE THEIR THOUGHTS AT ALL, &c. Ibid. p. 83 and 96.

You add in a note, "for ſome equivalent invention. See the "Perſian and other Eaſtern languages, which ſupply the place of "our article by termination."—As the generality of your readers are not likely to be benefited by this reference, it being rather out of their reach, I beg leave to propoſe another in the room of it. The Dano-Saxon language has the contrivance you here mention, or at leaſt ſomething like it. Porro ut apud veteres Cimbros, vel Danos Gothos, ex nominibus cum articulo vel pronomine in fine affixo nomina compoſita, totidemque nominum compoſitorum declinationes quot ſimplicium—Sic iſtiuſmodi nominum et declinationum haud pauca reperiuntur veſtigia apud Danos Saxonicos Scriptores. Hickes' Gram. H. S. cap. xx. §. 3.

has

has been contrived for the ſake of beauty, or any of the above-mentioned purpoſes *. You rank under the title of abbreviations, or ſubſtitutes of nouns and verbs, all prepoſitions and conjunctions whatever, though many of them are either nouns or verbs, *ipſo facto*, and at full length; as, *If*, *An*, *And*, *Not*, &c. And to ſum up the whole, you divide your abbreviations into abbreviations in terms, abbreviations in ſorts of words, abbreviations in conſtruction; a manner of dividing by no means logical. *Terms* and *ſorts of words* are appellations which I conceive to be applicable to all and every one of your abbreviations, and very improper therefore to eſtabliſh any ſpecific differences between them. Whether you were aware of this, and took no pleaſure in your new diviſion; or whether you really thought it had re-

* P. 33. Alluding to abbreviations in language, you ſay, "But ſhould any one, deſirous of underſtanding the purpoſe and meaning of all the parts of our elegant modern carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, that they were neceſſary for conveyance only, he would find himſelf woefully puzzled to account for the wheels, the ſeats, the ſprings, the blinds, the glaſſes, the lining, &c. not to mention the more ornamental parts of gilding, varniſh, &c.

Notwithſtanding this compariſon, you ſay, p. 37, "The firſt aim of language was to communicate our thoughts; the ſecond to do it with diſpatch. I mean entirely to diſregard whatever alterations or additions have been made for the ſake of beauty, or ornament, eaſe, gracefulneſs, or pleaſure.

As in the foregoing paſſage abbreviations are evidently conſidered as additions made to language, for the ſake of beauty, ornament, eaſe, &c. one would naturally conclude, from the clauſe in the ſecond, that you mean entirely to diſregard abbreviations in your work, and yet you make them the principal object of it.

ceived

ceived all the finiſhing in your power; you no ſooner have brought it to light, than you take your leave of it, and paſs over immediately to another chapter. You ſuffer it, indeed, to appear a ſecond time (p. 69.), but ſo different from what it was before, that it ceaſes, in ſome meaſure, to be the ſame. Abbreviations are there divided in the following manner: 1. *Abbreviations in terms*; 2. *Abbreviations in the manner of ſignification of words*. As ſecond thoughts are generally the beſt, I am inclined to give this laſt diviſion the preference, but unfortunately it comes too late to be of any uſe. Theſe, as I ſaid before, are ugly circumſtances in your new diſtribution of language. They naturally lead to the mortifying inference, that, whatever be your powers of demoliſhing and deſtroying, you do not appear to have thoſe of rebuilding what has been taken down.

Many people have long ſince ſuſpected, as well as yourſelf *, metaphyſics to be a mere cobweb: I will not ſay with the poet,

"Fit for ſcull,
"That's empty when the moon is full;"

but ſo thin, ſo airy, ſo flimſy, that a man may ſee, touch, feel, and handle it for ſome time, before he well knows which is the right, and which is the wrong ſide of it. And what you advance with reſpect to Mr. Locke wonderfully confirms this ſuſpi-

* The very term metaphyſic being nonſenſe, and all the ſyſtems of it, and controverſies concerning it, that are, or have been, in the world, being founded on the groſſeſt ignorance of words and of the nature of ſpeech. Diverſ. of Purley, p. 450.

cion:

cion: "*I conſider,*" you ſay, "*the whole of Mr. Locke's Eſſay as a philoſophical account of the firſt ſort of abbreviations in language;*" and you add, "*Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky miſtake* (FOR IT WAS A MISTAKE) *which he made when he called his Eſſay,* AN ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING *. Again: *Had he been aware of this, he would not have talked of a compoſition of ideas, but would have ſeen that it was merely a contrivance of language, and that the only compoſition was in the terms* †.

It is evident from your words, that, in your opinion, Mr. Locke was no better than in a miſt when he wrote his famous Eſſay, as he intended one thing, and did another. Now, though this may gratify ſome, it will not be perhaps ſo pleaſing to others.

Mr. Locke is ſtill a great favourite in our univerſities. I ſhould not wonder at hearing ſome young Wrangler, ready primed from thoſe quarters, addreſs you in the following terms:

"Indeed, Sir, it is not Mr. Locke, it is you, that "are all this while in a miſt with regard to abſtract "ideas. We underſtand Mr. Locke very well when "he ſays, *General and univerſal belong, not to the real "exiſtence of things, but they are the inventions and the "creatures of the underſtanding, made by it for its own "uſe, and concerns only ſigns. Univerſality does not "belong to things themſelves, which are all particular "in their exiſtence. When therefore we quit particu-"lars, the generals that reſt are only creatures of our "own making: their general nature being nothing but*

* Ibid. p. 42. † P. 49.

"*the*

" *the capacity they are put into of ſignifying or repre-*
" *ſenting particulars.*"—But we do not underſtand
" you, when you expreſs yourſelf on this ſubject in
" the following manner: *The buſineſs of the mind, as*
" *far as concerns language, extends no farther than to*
" *receive impreſſions,* i. e. *to have ſenſations and feel-*
" *ings; what are called its operations are merely the*
" *operations of language* *. We do not call a con-
" ſtellation a complex ſtar, nor a pair of bellows
" complex bellows, nor a pound of figs a complex
" fig. But we ſay *a complex being, a complex name, a*
" *complex ſign, becauſe* we conceive the particulars to
" coaleſce ſo as to make but one. Why ſhould we
" not ſay a *complex idea?* If in the latter caſe we
" conceive an abſurdity, we do no more than you do,
" when you conceive words to be at once abſolutely
" neceſſary and not at all neceſſary for communica-
" tion †. And now we are upon that chapter, what
" is your principle of diſpatch, but a fifth wheel to
" a carriage, more fit to retard than to accelerate its
" motion? *Language,* ſay you, *is intended not only*
" *for the communication of thought, but moreover for*
" *the diſpatch of that communication.* Upon this ſub-
" ject I ſhall obſerve,

" 1. That if any circumſtance, beſide the deſire
" of communicating thought, influence the mind in
" the contrivance of language, it muſt be that of
" communicating, not ſo much with diſpatch, as with
" clearneſs and preciſion. When we ſpeak, the firſt

* P. 70.

† See what has been ſaid above concerning the article, p. 11.

" thing

" thing we aim at is to be underſtood, and to raiſe " in the mind of others the ſame conſiderations and " affections as engage our own. And whatever be the " particular caſt of the ſign we uſe, it is the reſult " of that intention. *Men learn names, and uſe them* " *in talk with others, only that they may be underſtood,* " ſays Mr. Locke; and this is likewiſe the ſentiment " of Mr. De Broſſe, which has been quoted from you: " *On ne parle que pour être entendu; le plus grand avan-* " *tage d'une langue c'eſt d'être claire.* You ſuppoſe, " indeed, that, notwithſtanding this formal declara- " tion, he is well aware of the fitneſs and expedi- " ency of your fifth wheel; as he ſays afterward, " *L'eſprit humain veut aller vite dans ſes operations,* " *plus empreſſé de s'exprimer promptement, que curieux* " *de s'exprimer avec une juſteſſe exacte et réfléchie.* " But this is mere imagination. Monſ. De Broſſe, " in this latter paſſage, no more thought of your " abbreviations, than he thought of Alïoth in the " tail of the great bear: he only meant to ſay, that " if men are not always exact and preciſe in the " buſineſs of ſpeech, it is becauſe they chuſe rather " to have done with it, than to give themſelves any " trouble about it. I obſerve,

" 2. That there are few words in language whoſe " origin, nature, and particular character, may not be " traced from the above-mentioned principle. You " yourſelf allow that it accounts for the introduction " of noun and verb. And as to the reſt, nothing " can be a ſtronger indication that they proceed from " the ſame ſource, than the particular energy they " have in producing, with the others, the ſame effect.

" Without

" Without them, our meaning is vague and uncer-
" tain * : but no ſooner are they brought into play,
than

* According to the very learned Schultens, this energy of the article is no where more conſpicuous than in the Oriental languages. Quintilian had advanced, that the Latin language could do very well without the article. Upon which this author makes the following remark: " *Cæterum articulum non deſiderare Latinum Sermonem, glorioſius dictum quam verius putem . . . . . Ne de Græcis jam loquar, Orientales noſtri incredibilem quandam vim orationis cum elegantiſſima brevitate par articulum aſſecuti.* Inſtitut. ad Fundam Linguæ Heb. §. CIV.

Is it poſſible that the *ineredibilis vis*, & *elegantiſſima brevitas*, here aſcribed to the article, are the reſult of a mere deſire of diſpatch in the communication of thought? and ſhould we not look out for ſome more regular cauſe in the production of this effect?—I quote here Profeſſor Schultens, becauſe he was an excellent judge in thoſe matters; and to convince you of it, I ſhall adduce but one proof. Long before you thought of it, that is, about ſixty years ago, he had laid it down as a fact, that " GRAMMARIANS HAD " ALL ALONG MISTAKEN THE ROAD WHICH LEADS TO THE " PROPER EXPLANATION AND ETYMOLOGY OF PARTICLES," concerning which he expreſſes himſelf thus. Inſtit. Sectio VI. §. XCI. in a note.—*Minus commoda* Cl. *Altingii inter particulas declinabiles, & indeclinabiles. Ad priores refert pronomina. Ad poſteriores, adverbia, præpoſitiones, & conjnnctiones.—Atqui & pronomina quædam non declinantur, & bona pars adverbiorum ac præpoſitionum patitur declinationem, quippe quæ, maximam partem, ſint vel nomina vel ſubſtantiva, vel adjectiva. Hoc ſi perſpexiſſent primi Grammatici, multo felicius naturam, vim, mutationem, & conſtructionem particularum expedire potuiſſent,* Again, §. XVI. *Particulas reliquas, ſub quibus adverbia, præpoſitiones, conjunctiones, & interjectiones comprenſa minus rite indeclinabiles vocari dictum. Ratio hæc, quod revera declinentur præſertim adverbia, & præpoſitiones; utpote veri nominis, ſubſtantiva vel adjectiva, maximam partem. Rectius in ſeparatas, & inſeparabiles dirimuntur. Separatarum claſſes diſtinctius notabo: atque ſub ſingulis ſpecimina quædam exhibebo:* and immediately after comes a
long

" than it becomes viſible and palpable. But, ſay
" you, it cannot be denied, that they wonderfully
" accelerate communication. True. But that pro-
" perty I look upon as an acceſſory, not a principal,
" in the uſe for which they were intended. They
" ſhorten communication; becauſe without conciſe-
" neſs, i. e. reducing the number of terms, there
" can be no communication.

" 3. As the principle of diſpatch in communica-
" tion is not neceſſary to account for the diſtribution
" of language, ſo neither for the many diſputes and
" errors about this matter among philoſophers. They
" wrangled and blundered about it, plainly becauſe
" it never occurred to them that particles were, for
" the moſt part, no more than verbs or nouns derived
" from ancient language. This accounts much bet-
" ter for the matter in queſtion than any thing elſe
" that can be ſaid upon it. And ſhould you ever
" meet poor Harris in the walks of ſome future Lu-
" cian or Fontenelle, it is not improbable he would
" accoſt you in the following manner: You were
" very ſevere, Sir! in your ſtrictures upon my Her-

long ſtring of Hebrew adverbs, prepoſitions, and conjunctions, which he proves to be no more than nouns in that language; and then finiſhes with the following obſervation: Apud Latinos quoque conjunctiones multæ a nominibus oriundæ, *Ut verùm, verò, verum enimverò, quemadmodum, quamquam, additum & verbum in quamlibet, quolibet, quovis.*

Mr. Schultens adheres to this plan in all his writings. He endeavours every where to baniſh from the theory of languages all notions of myſtery, all kinds of anomalies, and to account for the nature of every part of ſpeech, by bringing it as near as poſſible to its firſt origin.

" mes when above. What induced me to write that " book was not the deſire of offending you, or any " perſon whatever. I was actuated by the ſame mo- " tive which urged you to write your Diverſions of " Purley. I wiſhed to diſcover what had remained, " till my time, a ſecret among my countrymen. I " miſcarried; becauſe I ſaw no trace of noun or " verb in the words I wiſhed to explain. Hence " my flights in the higher regions of metaphy- " ſics. If I have been too daring, why ſhould " you avail yourſelf of my failure to depreciate my " talents? Am I then the only one who has pre- " ſumed upon himſelf? and have I dipped my pen in " gall to hurt the feelings of any one? Health, ſpi- " rits, ingenuity, may carry a man through any " wicked practice in the world we came from. But " here, Sir, nothing can ſupport us but the remem- " brance of our good actions; and as this is the mea- " ſure of our happineſs, let us endeavour to make it " as great as we can by forgetting, I, my Adequates " Preventives; and you, your Anglo-Saxon Etymo- " logies."

In this, or ſome ſuch manner, will the Lockiſts give vent to their rage, when they come to anſwer your ſtrictures on their Maſter's Eſſay. For my part, I ſhall not undertake to defend the propriety of his expreſſion, with regard to ſuch aggregates of ideas as conſtitute the claſſes, gender, ſpecies, and which he calls *complex ideas*. I am not fond of labouring in vain; and it is evident from your diſcoveries, that, in theſe matters, it is the eaſieſt thing in the world for a man to do his utmoſt, and miſs his aim after all.

I ſhall only obſerve, that, as the thing ſignified muſt neceſſarily exiſt before the ſign, there is a ſtriking abſurdity in repreſenting the former as a mere effect of the latter: and one is inclined to ſuſpect theſe to be your notions, when, ſpeaking of abſtract ideas, you ſay, "*it is a mere contrivance of language; the "only compoſition is in the terms, and not in the ideas.*" p. 49. And again, "*The buſineſs of the mind, as far "as concerns language, extends no farther than to re- "ceive impreſſions; that is, to have ſenſations and "feelings; what is called its operations, are merely "the operations of language.*" May it not be inferred from theſe expreſſions, that, in your opinion, it is the term that gives birth to the abſtract idea, and not the latter to the term? And if you deny it, will not the whole of this laboured diſſertation dwindle into a mere logomachy?

As to the circumſtances which may have attended the deſire of communicating thought, and influenced the nature and order of the ſigns contrived for that purpoſe, I will not go ſo far as to ſay, with thoſe I have taken the liberty of introducing here, that the deſire of diſpatch had no ſhare in that contrivance, as it would be an eaſy matter to prove the contrary. But I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that I do not believe it the only, nor even the principal, circumſtance to be taken into conſideration, in order to account for the diviſion and diſtribution of language.

The deſire which ariſes in the mind, next to that of communicating thought, is certainly to uſe ſuch ſigns as will convey the meaning clearly and preciſely; which naturally leads to the uſe of abbrevi-

ations, as without them, according to your own ideas, this end cannot be attained. p. 245. Abbreviations, therefore, ſeem to bear a much ſtronger affinity to the deſire of *perſpicuity* than to that of *diſpatch*. This latter, conſidered by itſelf, ſeems little calculated for any regular purpoſes. It may produce abbreviations, but of the kind only to which Monſ. Le Préſident De Broſſes alludes, when he ſays, *L'eſprit humain veut aller vite dans ſon opération; plus empreſſé de s'exprimer promptement, que curieux de s'exprimer avec une juſteſſe réfléchie. S'il n'a pas l'inſtrument qu'il faudroit employer, il ſe ſert de celui qu'il a tout prêt:* When guided by the former, it produces conciſeneſs, but conciſeneſs attended with neatneſs and perſpicuity.

After the deſire of perſpicuity in the communication of thought comes that of variety; a deſire ſo deeply rooted in human nature, that it looks for the gratification of it in every object it contemplates, in every ſtudy it purſues, in every amuſement it partakes. "*All the ſenſes delight in it, and equally are* "*averſe to ſameneſs,*" ſays an ingenious artiſt. (Hogarth, Analyſis of Beauty, chap. II.). *The ear is as much offended with one continued note, as the eye is with being fixed to a point, or to the view of a dead wall.* Can it be imagined that it had no hand (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) in the contrivance of ſound for the communication of thought? All our ſenſes lead us to a contrary ſuppoſition: and experience teaches us, that it interfered in the framing of language, even ſo far as to give birth to a ſort of words which otherwiſe would not have appeared in it. For what are pronouns but words of that kind?

kind? The principle of diſpatch in communication, on which you lay ſo much ſtreſs to account for the origin and nature of particles, is therefore by no means ſufficient for that purpoſe. It is the truth, but not the whole truth. It may interfere in the contrivance of the article, conjunctions, and prepoſitions; but as a ſecondary, not a ruling principle. The only circumſtance, in which it acts in the laſt-mentioned capacity, is apparently in vulgar elliptical forms of ſpeech.

Advertiſement, p. 102.

It is generally at the beginning, immediately after the title-page, that this tedious and troubleſome part of a book makes its appearance. In yours it does not come forth till about the middle of it; perhaps as good a place as any, eſpecially if the author means ſeriouſly to have it peruſed. For, as the French ſay, *L'appétit vient en mangeant*, I ſhall therefore, without any farther heſitation, follow your example, and add here what I have to ſay by way of advertiſement.

I. Anglo-Saxon literature is, no doubt, an object worth the attention of the people of this country. In order to underſtand the meaning and drift of the excellent laws under which we live, it is neceſſary we ſhould have ſome knowledge of the language of thoſe who made them. Your deſire, therefore, of promoting the ſtudy of it among your readers, and your preſenting them, for that purpoſe, with a table of its alphabetical characters, is liberal, and what one might naturally expect from a public-ſpirited man as you are. However, as nothing is more likely to prove fatal to that ſtudy than unforeſeen impediments at the firſt

ſetting out, you muſt allow me the liberty to ſay, that your table is not altogether ſo compleat as it ought to be. It wants the wings of Mercury; the abbreviations, without which there can be no diſpatch in communication. This is the firſt hint I wiſhed to give you by way of advertiſement.

II. As I am not without fears about your ſucceſs, and expect that the Lockiſts will ſoon appear in a body againſt you, I have been examining your outworks again; and as I find them abſolutely untenable, I would adviſe you to abandon them in caſe of a regular attack, and to ſhut yourſelf up in your capital work, which is of good deſign and workmanſhip, and will ſtand the beſt battering-ram in the world, provided however you beſtow a little repairing upon it. In what follows, I ſhall point out to you the places where this is moſt wanted; and begin with the chapter of the nouns, on which I ſhall make two remarks.

Firſt, In matters of little or no conſequence, men in general, and even the wiſeſt, are very prone to take, upon the credit of others, what they will not take the trouble of examining themſelves; and this moſt likely was the caſe when Dr. Prieſtley aſſerted, upon the credit of Mr. Harris, that *Moon* is of the feminine gender in the Northern languages, as it is in the Greek and Latin. Had Mr. Harris aſſerted likewiſe, that two and two make five, it is more than probable the Doctor would not have taken his word for it. Be that as it may, he was unguarded when he took it for granted that Mr. Harris could not be miſtaken in a point ſo much in his way: but ſo are you (excuſe my freedom) when, writing upon this matter, you boldly

boldly declare, " *that in all the Northern languages of* " *this part of the globe which we inhabit,* MOON *is* " *maſculine.*" I do not know the *Icelandic*, *Laplandiſh*, or *Greenlandiſh*; but I know the Low Dutch tolerably well, and take upon me to ſay, that *Moon*, *Maan*, in that language is feminine; and ſo feminine, that there is no boor in Holland whoſe ears would not be ſhocked at hearing one ſay, *Het light des maans*, inſtead of *Het light der maane*, the light of the moon. It is particularly unfortunate for you to have made this ſtumble at your firſt onſet againſt Mr. Harris.

It were to be wiſhed (and this is my Second Remark), that you had been a little more explicit upon the reaſon which you aſſign for the Engliſh language not admitting a gender in the nouns of things inanimate. This, you ſay, is owing to the circumſtance of the relation of nouns being expreſſed in it by the place or prepoſition. But is not this the caſe alſo in the French, Italian, and Spaniſh? And yet in every one of theſe the nouns in queſtion claſs among thoſe which have a ſpecific gender. The truth is, that, in all other languages (not including, however, thoſe I am not acquainted with, as the Samoyede, Eſquimaux, Aſſinipoul, &c.) the relation of gender is expreſſed, not, as you ſuppoſe, by the place and prepoſition, but by an inflexion, either in the noun or article prefixed to it. But the noun in Engliſh being ſuſceptible of inflexion only in a few inſtances, and the article in none, it is no wonder that a diſtinction of the ſpecific gender ſhould not take place in it at all with regard to the nouns in queſtion. But it is

wonderful, that ſome * ſhould have repreſented it as an ornament, and the reſult of thought and contrivance, when in fact it is a blemiſh †, and merely the effect of chance. Any one converſant with the hiſtory of the Engliſh language, knows that it formerly admitted that diſtinction, as the Dutch and Friſic do to this day; and that it did not loſe this mark of its deſcent till after the Conqueſt; when it was ſo much altered by the mixture of the French or Norman, as to become in ſome meaſure a new language. We may take it for granted therefore, that the ſame circumſtance which cauſed Anglo-Saxon nouns to take a French termination for the formation of the plural, and French verbs Engliſh ones for the diſtinction of tenſe, number, and perſon, influenced likewiſe the gender of their nouns, and cauſed it to be omitted, and grow at laſt obſolete, in thoſe that were appropriated to things inanimate.

* Harris and Lowth. By whom we are given to underſtand, that, for want of this contrivance, no language, except the Engliſh, can keep clear of ambiguity and obſcurity in the Proſopopoeïa. Had it been conſiſtent with the gravity of their character, they might have added the following ſtory, which would have been much more to the purpoſe. A meſſenger was ſent to the Queen of Navarre, with a letter, and ordered, *de la baiſer en la lui préſentant*: and ſo the blockhead kiſſed the Queen, inſtead of the letter; which could not have happened, had the French language been without gender for the name of inanimate things.

† It muſt be confeſſed, that, by affixing a gender to every noun, the Greek and the Latin will, in many inſtances, and more particularly in elliptical forms of ſpeech, admit of a conciſeneſs and perſpicuity of expreſſion, which is peculiar to them, *Calida lavari, frigidam bibere*, οἱ τὰ μάλακα φορεῦντες.

Καλεῦσι δ' Ἰοκάστην με· τὸτο γὰρ πατὴρ
Εθετο·

See Valckenaer in Euripidis Phœn. v. 12.

## Interjections and Articles.

As opprobrious language is not uſual with you, eſpecially when there is no occaſion for it, one is ſurpriſed to hear you rail at the interjections, and call them *brutiſh and inarticulate ſounds, which have nothing to do with ſpeech, and are only the miſerable refuſe of it*. But, when a man has bragged to his neighbours of the ſpaciouſneſs of his houſe, has laid a conſiderable wager, has ſworn a great oath, that it will contain them all; and finds himſelf, upon trial, more pent than a negro on board an African trader, or a forlorn hope in the houſe of an Amſterdam Zieleverkooper,—what can he do, but turn out ſome, and call them a parcel of low-lived ſcoundrels who intrude themſelves into gentlemens' company?

As you had aſſerted that there were but two ſorts of words in language, words neceſſary for the communication of thought, and words neceſſary for the diſpatch of that communication, the interjections could not but prove extremely troubleſome. You perceived immediately that they could by no means whatever be forced into either of your claſſes; and yet they had by preſcription an undoubted right to the place they occupied among the parts of ſpeech. To alter your claſſes, was giving up your words neceſſary for the diſpatch of communication, and that would have been a pity. To meddle with the other claſs, was bringing down the whole edifice at once, and that would have been terrible. No wonder if you fretted and fumed, and came at laſt to the reſolution

lution of uſing, with theſe *ſoi diſants* parts of ſpeech, the ſame liberty as the Emperor Joſeph uſed with the monks in Flanders—and ſo—turned them out. This I take to be the beſt reaſon which can be given for your violent and arbitrary proceedings againſt the poor interjections. And had not ſome propitious circumſtances intervened, you would very likely have been as cruel to the article.

The general terms being by themſelves indefinite, as to the extent of their ſignification, it is evident that ſome ſign is wanted to fix the ſenſe in which they are to be taken. And as this is the office of the articles, it is not leſs evident that they are as neceſſary for the communication of thought, as the general terms themſelves can be; and therefore it would be madneſs to refuſe them a place among the parts of ſpeech. But they are neither nouns nor verbs; nor can they, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the words, be called abbreviations of them, becauſe they have not a ſingle feature belonging to that ſpecies. They were therefore in no ſmall danger of undergoing the ſame fate with the interjections, if by great good luck you had not contrived to diſpoſe of them, by ſuppoſing a ſecond kind of abbreviations or ſubſtitutes, beſides thoſe you had already contrived. The firſt were abbreviations or ſubſtitutes of known words in a language; whereas the ſecond kind, which was to comprehend the article, is abbreviations or ſubſtitutes of words not known in language.

" *From the neceſſity of general terms* (I quote your " words) *follows immediately the neceſſity of the arti-* " *cle, whoſe buſineſs it is to reduce their generality,*

" *and*

" *and upon occaſion to employ general terms for parti-*
" *cular; ſo that the article in combination with the*
" *general terms is merely a ſubſtitute. But then it dif-*
" *fers from thoſe ſubſtitutes which we have ranked*
" *under the general head of abbreviations, becauſe it is*
" *neceſſary for the communication of thought, and ſup-*
" *plies the place of words not in the language; whereas*
" *abbreviations are not neceſſary for communication,*
" *and ſupply the place of words which are in the lan-*
" *guage* *." The beginning of this period is unexceptionable; but the latter part of it is by no means ſo.

*Subſtitutes of words which are not in language.* As theſe words muſt needs form a very numerous tribe, it is wonderful, ſome will ſay, how you could ſo eaſily find out ſuch as were more particularly in want of ſubſtitutes. I deſpiſe ſuch remarkers, ſay you. " *Theſe are the people who have the accent neither of*
" *Chriſtian, Pagan, or man; nor can ſpeak ſo many*
" *words together with as much propriety as Balaam's*
" *aſs did* †." Hold, Sir!—theſe are alſo the people of whom it has been ſaid, with no leſs propriety, *C'eſt une nation puiſſante, Dieu en a béni la race* ‡! You will do better, therefore, to keep upon good terms with them; and the more, as in the preſent inſtance you have no manner of advantage over them.

There is reaſon to reject, in a great meaſure, your notion of the article. It is a ſubſtitute, no doubt; but if there be caſes in which it is evidently the ſubſtitute of words which are in the language, why

* P. 96. † P. 43. in a note. ‡ La Fontaine.

ſhould

ſhould we go upon an idle chaſe, and hunt for words not in the language? Numberleſs are the inſtances in which it anſwers this purpoſe in the Greek, and in ſo pointed a manner, that it is hardly poſſible to miſtake the words for which it ſtands. I ſhall quote a few; and if you wiſh for more, you may ſee a cloud of them in Vigerus's Idiotiſms *.

It ſtands for ὅδος in the following phraſe, ἄγεσθαι τὴν ἐπι θανάτῳ ad mortem rapi—for ἡμέρα, in—τῇ πρωτεραίᾳ, i. e. pridie—for ἀποφθέγμα—in—τὸ τὲ Σολώνος for υἱος in ὁ τὲ Δεμοσθένες. And if I were to affirm, that, in Engliſh, French, or Flemiſh, there is not an inſtance in which the definite article does not ſtand for the name of the gender, ſpecies, or difference of the thing in queſtion, I believe I ſhould not go beyond the truth. And I adhere to this hypotheſis the more firmly, as, without it, it is hardly poſſible to account for the article being placed in theſe languages ſo frequently before particular nouns. Before the general term it may be ſaid to reſtrain, or rather determine, the ſenſe in which that term is to be taken, and more eſpecially in the French. But what ſhall we ſay, when it is placed before a particular name, as in theſe inſtances—*the ſun—the moon—the earth—the ſky—the clouds?* There is no reduction nor reſtriction whatever in any of theſe caſes; yet the neceſſity of the article is marked in them as ſtrongly as any where. Its deſtination, therefore, is not confined to the uſe you mention; it evidently anſwers ſome further purpoſe.

* Cap. III. Sect. 1. Reg. 3.

The

The human mind is for ever buſy in treaſuring up every thing which comes within the reach of its perceptions; and, that its ſtores may be of uſe and always at hand, they are divided into various claſſes; and every claſs has its peculiar name: by which means every perception becomes at once diſtinct and communicable. By calling over the claſſes, we find a name for any object whatever; and at the ſame time that we retain ſome idea of it ourſelves, we can, when we pleaſe, make it known to others. In either caſe, the name of the claſs is always the firſt thing which obtrudes itſelf upon the mind; and that name is moſtly underſtood in the article which immediately precedes the particular name of the thing in queſtion.

SUN, MOON, STARS, belong to that claſs of beings which are called the heavenly bodies; and it is that claſs I mean to expreſs when I ſay, THE SUN, THE MOON, THE STARS. This becomes unqueſtionable from the following inſtances. *The Mediterranean* is evidently the Mediterranean Sea; *The Pyrenees*, the Pyrenean Mountains; *The Bermudas*, the Iſles ſo called. Again, *the wall*, *the garden*, *the yard*, manifeſtly indicate a whole, of which theſe are the particulars; and the name of that whole is expreſſed, or at leaſt indicated, by the article prefixed to the name of the particular. The French uſe it before the names of countries: they ſay, *La France*, *L'Italie*, *L'Eſpagne*; becauſe theſe countries are by them conſidered in theſe expreſſions as parts of a whole; and that whole is Europe. They alſo ſay, *L'Europe*, *L'Aſie*, *L'Afrique*; and then that whole is the habitable earth. In ſhort, there is hardly an inſtance

in thoſe languages, in which the reference of the article (which is called the definite) to words known in the language is not palpable *. Your placing it therefore

* For the further elucidation of this matter, I beg leave to quote here a few remarks which I made ſome time ago on the uſe of the article in the French language.

L'article étant deſtiné à marquer les différens ſens dans leſquels ſe peuvent prendre les noms appellatifs & communs ; il ſemble qu'il devienne, en quelque façon, inutile avant les noms, qui ne pouvant déſigner qu'un objet à la fois, ſont par cela méme incapables de varier, pour ce qui regarde l'étendue de leur ſignification. Cependant il n'eſt pas rare de voir ces noms précédés de l'article. On dit, par exemple, *L'Etienne qui a écrit l'Apologie pour Hérodote. Le Clodius qui ſe déchaina contre Cicéron. On trouve dans l'hiſtoire des Juifs un Zaccharie, tué dans le temple avant la venue du Meſſie.* C'eſt que dans ces façons de parler, on conſidére l'individu portant tel ou tel nom, comme appartenant à tel ou à tel ordre de perſonnes, dont le terme commun eſt d'être toutes appellées de méme. Deſortoque le nom propre devient ici un nom appellatif, & comme il ſe prend dans un ſens particulier, il faut néceſſairement, qu'il ſoit précédé de l'article défini.

Mais il y a des noms propres qu'on donne à des étres, en quelque façon uniques, & qui ſont néamoins précédés de l'article. Ainſi, quoiqu'il n'y ait, ſuivant la façon de penſer des hommes en général, qu'un ſeul ſoleil, qu'une ſeule lune, qu'une ſeule terre, on dit malgré cela avec l'article, *le ſoleil, la lune, la terre.* Parceque chacun de ces étres tient à un tout que l'on a toujours préſent à l'eſprit quand on les veut nommer, & auquel on les renvoye viſiblement, en mettant l'article avant les noms qui les déſignent. Quand on dit *L'Europe* ou *L'Aſie*, on ſent que cette idée en réveille d'abord une autre qui lui ſert, pour ainſi dire, de baſe ; & cette idée c'eſt la terre en général, que l'on ſait étre diviſée en certaines portions, & qui ſe préſente comme telle à l'eſprit, dès qu'on entend nommer quelqu'une de ces portions. Or c'eſt pour faire ſentir le raport à l'idée qui lui ſert de baſe, et en méme tems pour la diſtinguer

therefore in the oppoſite light, in order to diſtinguiſh it from thoſe ſubſtitutes which you call ſubſtitutes of words known in the language, is prepoſterous and unſatisfactory. For though we ſhould allow it to have the uſe here aſſigned to it (which we do not allow at preſent), yet, as it is ~~ne~~ its general character, it is wrong to build upon that, and that only, its ſpecific difference, from ſubſtitutes of words known in the language. As to the latter, we have ſeen already with what propriety they are ſtiled, without any exception, *ſubſtitutes*; when moſt, if not all of them, are in fact the very words of which they are ſuppoſed to ſupply the place. Nor ſhall I repeat here what I have ſaid concerning your hypotheſis, of their not being neceſſary for communication. I have made it appear pretty plain, that you had yourſelf no great confidence in it.

guer des autres portions, qu'on ſe ſert de l'article avant le nom qui lui eſt propre.

En général on peut dire, que l'article avant les noms des êtres que nous avons nommés uniques ſemble les déſigner, ou comme parties d'un tout, ou comme individus de quelque eſpéce; & dans ce dernier cas, l'article tient lieu en quelque façon du nom appellatif; ou ce qui revient au méme du nom de l'eſpéce. Ainſi *La Baltique*, c'eſt ſans contredit, *La Mer Baltique*; *La Seine*, la riviére de la Seine; *Le Veſuve*, le mont appellé Véſuve. Manière de s'enoncer parfaitement analogue à célle dont on conçoit ces choſes, & que l'on retient encore toutes les fois que les noms des individus ſont trop vagues pour en donner des idées bien diſtinctes. Ainſi on dit *Le fleuve St. Laurent, Le lac Champlain, Les Iſles Philippines.*

## Chapter VI. Of the Word THAT.

Except what relates to politics, which, though ever ſo ſound, cannot with any propriety be introduced into a work of this kind, the whole of this chapter deſerves attention. The light in which it repreſents the ſtructure of language is curious; and if you go on ſolving in ſo plauſible a manner this intricate buſineſs, you will make ample amends for the little recreation we have met with hitherto in the Diverſions of Purley.

I beg leave, however, to make a few remarks on the word THAT.

There are inſtances in which it does not ſeem ſuſceptible of the ſenſe into which you reſolve it: ſuch are thoſe where it is connected, in one and the ſame phraſe, with the pronoun perſonal IT; as for inſtance, *It is reaſonable that we ſhould do by others, as we would be done by ourſelves*; *It is not to be expected that in a ſtate of tryal like the preſent, we ſhould meet with no difficulties*; *Be it known, that*, &c. Again, when it is preceded immediately by the word *intent* in the dative caſe, as, *To the intent, that when they come up, they might teach their children the ſame.*

It ſeems as if in the preceding inſtances the word THAT could not admit of your reſolution, without introducing both redundancy and confuſion. Whatever, ſay you, be the name which is given to it, whatever be its ſituation and appearance, it is one and the ſame word, namely, the article, and ſtands for THAT THING. But is not the ſenſe of this laſt expreſſion implied

implied already in the pronoun IT, which begins the two firſt of the preceding phraſes? And if ſo, is there not a kind of awkwardneſs and redundancy in the article which follows? It is very poſſible, however, that it will admit of your reſolution, without my being aware of it. I am far, therefore, from alledging theſe inſtances as proofs that you are wrong. I give them only as difficulties which may be thrown in your way. And of the ſame nature is the next remark.

In the dead languages, the ſenſe of the words which conſtitute a phraſe depends on their termination chiefly; whereas, in the modern languages, this point is principally determined by their reſpective poſition. There is but one poſition, either in Engliſh, French, or Dutch, which can be given to the words expreſſing the ſenſe of the following Latin phraſe, *Petrus amat Deum:* the leaſt alteration in it will affect its meaning, and make it either nonſenſe, or at leaſt the reverſe of the ſenſe which is intended. Each word, therefore, in the modern languages, has its particular poſition, from which it never departs, except for the ſake of the metre in poetry. And this poſition depends entirely upon the ſpecific difference of words.

Whether our forefathers had, or had not, ſigns by which to expreſs this difference, they certainly were ſenſible of it; as no word, in their language, any more than in ours, ever took the place of another, but all had their fixed and peculiar ſtation, according as they were either nouns or verbs, &c. As this is a

well-known truth, I ſhall adduce no proof for the confirmation of it, but paſs on to its application.

Is it not remarkable, that the word here in queſtion ſhould occupy different places in the Anglo-Saxon *, and in its kindred the Dutch, the Friſic, the German, according as it ſtands for a pronoun, or a conjunction; that in the former inſtance it ſhould be placed between the auxiliary and the participle, and in the latter after the participle in the compound tenſes; that as a pronoun governed by the verb, it is placed thus, Ic hæbbe ðæt ſæde; and when uſed as a conjunction in this manner, ic hæbbe ſæde ðæt?—But this is not the only inſtance in which it aſſumes a different turn according to the different purpoſes for which it is uſed. When in the ſhape of a pronoun, it has no kind of influence over the words which follow: whereas it makes a total change in their order if it ſtand for a conjunction. So if, in tranſlating the following phraſe, *I tell thee now Siward* THAT *I have here already ſet down theſe few briefes of ancient bookes*, you make *That* a pronoun, the ſentence will be in the Anglo-Saxon as follows: ic ſecȝe þe nu Ziþeꞃd ðæt, ic hæbbe heꞃe ȝeſetðaſ ꝼeaþa bÿſna oꝼ ðan ealdan bocum: but if you make it what is commonly called a con-

* To thoſe who attend only to the rules of poſition in the Engliſh, the Anglo-Saxon language may ſeem uncouth and unconnected, as it did to Dr. Johnſon; but that it is ſo in fact, no one acquainted with the rules of poſition, either in the German or Dutch, will affirm. Theſe rules form a very important object in the ſtudy of thoſe languages, and will apply to the Anglo-Saxon in every particular.

junction,

junction, the next arrangement will take place, ic ꝼecȝe þe nu Ziþeꞃð ðæt ic heꞃ ȝeꞃett hæbbe, &c.*

The ſame holds with regard to the Dutch: your firſt example, *I wiſh you to believe*, &c. tranſlated in that language, will have, if you ſuppoſe THAT a pronoun, this appearance, *Ick verzoek u te gelooven dat* (ding) *Ick bezeer niet gaarn eene vlieg*. If a conjunction, the following, *Ick verzoeke u te gelooven dat ick niet gaarn eene vlieg bezeere*. Here you ſee the verb finiſhes the ſecond part of the ſentence; whereas, before, it begins it. But enough of THAT.

Conjunctions in your ſyſtem, are not indeclinable or ſeparate parts of ſpeech having a certain manner of ſignification by themſelves, but words belonging to the ſpecies either of nouns or verbs, and which by a ſkilful herald may be eaſily traced home to their own family and origin. As the origin of the word IF, ſo eaſily diſcoverable, is extremely favourable to this way of thinking, it is with great propriety you begin with it your etymological conjectures.

IF is certainly the imperative mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb Giꝼan; for in this language, as ſtill in the German and Dutch, the imperative mood is formed by dropping the termination of the infinitive mood AN or EN. The imperative mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb Giꝼan can be no other therefore than Giꝼ. And this is the very form in which the conjunction IF makes its appearance in old Engliſh authors, as you have ſufficiently proved. It is made, indeed, to govern the ſubjunctive mood; an influence,

* Ancient Monuments in the Saxon Tongue, by M. L'iſle, Lond. 1638.

ſome will ſay, which could hardly be aſcribed to it, were it conſidered merely as an appendix to the verb Gifan. But it is not improbable that this circumſtance, together with many others, in the modern languages, is owing to the exceſſive care of ſome dunces, who having been whipped ſeverely, when young, for neglecting the proper government of conjunctions in the Latin, have contracted the habit of making their equivalents govern with them the ſame mood in other languages. Now for An, from the verb Anan, to give.

I have known a public ſpeaker who would now and then take a ſurvey of his audience, and call out (if he eſpied any drooping noddles or falling jaws) "Brethren, I will tell you a ſtory." As I think this an excellent method of rouſing the attention of a reader or hearer, for ever inclined to grow drowſy when the ſubject is ſo, I ſhall not ſcruple to make uſe of it upon this occaſion.

It is well known that the boors in Frieſland, one of the United Provinces, have ſo far retained ancient cuſtoms, as to be, in dreſs, language, and manners, exactly the ſame people which they were five hundred years ago; a circumſtance that induced Junius the ſon to pay them a viſit, and to paſs a few months among them. In a tour I made to that country ſome years ago, I was at a gentleman's houſe, from which I made frequent excurſions into the inner part of the Province. In one of theſe, I was obliged to take the firſt ſheltering place in my way, being overtaken by a violent ſhower. It was a farm houſe, where I ſaw ſeveral children: and I ſhall never forget the

ſpeech

ſpeech which one of them, an overgrown babe, made to his mother. He was ſtanding at her breaſt; and, after he had done with one, I heard him ſay to her, *Trientjen yan my 't oor*; i. e. "Kate! give me "t'other." I little thought, at the time, I ſhould have ſo good an opportunity of making uſe of this ſtory as I have at preſent.

An, you ſay, is the imperative of the verb Anan, juſt as If is the imperative of Gıꝼan. I confeſs this latter deduction is ſo plain, ſo natural, and ſo ſatisfactory, that it affords great encouragement to take it as a model for all the reſt. But we ſhould not fancy that words exiſt, or muſt have exiſted, becauſe, having adopted a certain method of finding out origins, we cannot poſſibly do without them. I have been looking out with ſome anxiety for the Anglo-Saxon verb Anan, but can get very little information about it. I find, indeed, in King Alfred's will the following article: Æꝛꝛꞇ ıc an Eaðꝑaðe mınum elðꝑa ꝛuna. *Firſt, I give to Edward my eldeſt ſon.* And from the expreſſion IC AN, it ſhould ſeem as if there really exiſted ſuch verb in the Anglo-Saxon as Anan. But as this is the only ſign of life it has given, as one may ſay, for theſe thouſand years, I am inclined to look upon that ſign as being rather equivocal, and ſuſpect that the true reading of the will is, not ıc an, but ıc un, from unnan *cedere, concedere*; this laſt verb being common in the Anglo-Saxon, and nothing more eaſy than to miſtake an u for an a, in that language, as well as in the Engliſh. However, as I have not ſeen hitherto any manuſcript, on whoſe authority I can ground the juſtneſs of my

conjecture, I do not give it you as any thing certain; and if you perſiſt in giving the preference to the old reading, the ſtory of the babe is certainly in your favour; for there is as little difference between An and ỳan, as between Un and an. With me it will remain a matter of doubt, whether there ever exiſted ſuch a verb as Anan, the ſame in ſignification, and yet different in origin, with Gifan. It is by no means probable, that a people, who had hardly a conveyance for one idea in a thouſand, ſhould have procured two ſuch noble conveyances for one ſingle idea. This is a piece of luxury, which even the moſt civilized nation ſeldom allow themſelves.

The next word you undertake to explain according to your principles, is UNLESS. You ſuppoſe it to be the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb unlefan, to diſmiſs. But to thoſe who, like me, judge from analogy, the propriety of this derivation is by no means obvious. *We cannot love God, diſmiſs he prepareth our hearts. No man cometh to my father, diſmiſs my father draweth him. Diſmiſs you repent, you ſhall all likewiſe periſh.* The turn which language has taken with regard to this expreſſion will not bear ſuch phraſeology. The *Latin*, the *Italian*, the *French*, make uſe here of the word *except*. The *Anglo-Saxon* and the *Dutch* of its equivalent, utneman uỳtneemen ..... which ſeems more natural, and which muſt have had the preference from time immemorial: ſince, according to the paſſage you very properly quote from *Feſtus*, even the ancient Romans uſed it inſtead of NISI. For *Nemut* is a word ſo like the imperative mode of *uytneemen*,

both in ſound and ſenſe, that there is great reaſon to believe that it is an adoption from the Teutonic verb. But this is not the only reaſon I can alledge againſt your hypotheſis; it is not even the ſtrongeſt.

If there be ſuch a verb in the Anglo-Saxon, it muſt be the ſame with onleȝon, a compound of on and leȝan, and the Dutch *ontloſſen:* but neither leȝan in the Anglo-Saxon, nor LOSSEN in the Dutch, ſignifies *to diſmiſs.* Leȝan, in its primary ſignification, means to *unbind*; in its ſecondary, to *redeem*, to *unload*, *to ſet at liberty. Solvere, redimere, liberare*, ſays the dictionary. In the firſt ſenſe it anſwers to the Engliſh, *to looſen*, i. e. *to make looſe*; in the ſecond, the Dutch *ontloſſen.* Skinner, indeed, tranſlates onleȝan, or rather aleȝan, *to diſmiſs.* But Skinner is often ignorant, ſays Dr. Johnſon *; and I reject his tranſlation, becauſe I am certain the equivalent in Dutch *ontloſſen* is not ſuſceptible of it.—But further.

As there is an equivalent in the French of the word UNLESS very much reſembling it in turn, it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that it ſhould never have occurred to you, that poſſibly the one is a tranſlation, or at leaſt an imitation of the other. This equivalent is A MOINS QUE. What word more likely to have given birth to *unleſs*; if we may ſuppoſe the latter to be a compound of *on* and *leſs?* And if the Anglo-Saxon dialect admits of *onlaſt*, at the laſt; *onbæc*, at the back; *onbutan*, externally; *on æffe*, oppoſite; why ſhould it not alſo admit of *onleſs*, for A MOINS QUE? This conjecture is the more probable, as it

* Preface to his Dictionary.

was not till after the Conqueſt, when the Engliſh became a mixture of the French and Anglo-Saxon, that the word UNLESS was introduced into it; the Anglo-Saxon having uſed till then, as you yourſelf have obſerved, NEMTHE, or NYMTHE, inſtead of it. And yet you never mention A MOINS QUE; no, not even where you name the words correſponding in other languages to the Engliſh word UNLESS. The French SINON, unleſs you add QUE to it, which you do not, is by no means of the number. It is ſometimes uſed as an adverb in the ſenſe of *otherwiſe*, or *in default*. *Faites ce qu'il dit, ſinon, n'eſperez nulle grace de ſa part*; *do what he bids you, elſe expect no favour from him*. Sometimes as, *venia ſit verbo*, an exceptive conjunction, when it muſt be tranſlated *but*. *Je n'ai autre choſe a vous dire, ſinon que vous en uſerez comme il vous plaira*; *I have nothing to tell you, but that you are at liberty to do what you pleaſe*. p. 214.

LES. *The imperative of* LEȝAN.

The orthography of this word, I preſume to ſay, is LESS. It is thus Ben Jonſon ſpells it in the paſſages you here quote from him; and it ſhould ſeem as if civilized people had no other way of ſpelling it. You chooſe, however, upon the authority of Gawin Douglas, to write it with a ſingle s; and, truly, I do not wonder at it, as in that garb it will anſwer your purpoſe much better than in the common one. It is poſſible that LES ſhould be the imperative of LEȝAN; but LESS can have no pretenſions to it: at leaſt not according to your principles; for, if my

memory

memory does not deceive me, you have ſaid ſomewhere, or at leaſt given us to underſtand, that words may loſe, but not acquire, letters, as they recede from their origin.

You do not depend, however, in ſo implicit a manner upon Gawin Douglas's ſkill of ſpelling, as to adopt it upon every occaſion. You ſcruple not to depart from it wherever it proves unfavourable to ſome new etymology. A ſtrong proof that the motive I have juſt now mentioned has no ſmall degree of influence over your judgement in theſe matters. No ſooner has the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb Leȝan ſhewn itſelf with you in one form, than it appears in another. In the very next article to that we are upon here, you ſuppoſe it to be, not Les, but Leas: and why? becauſe you labour to prove there that *Leaſleas*, *Botleas*, and the like Anglo-Saxon words, are compounds of a noun and the imperative in queſtion, which would not have been quite ſo clear, had that imperative appeared in its uſual form. But, it will be ſaid, how can Leaȝ be the imperative of Leȝan? Verbs may loſe, but not acquire, letters, as they recede from their origin. Whether you were aware of this difficulty, and wiſhed to make yourſelf eaſy about it, or whether chance ſo far interpoſed in your favour as to remove it without your knowledge, I cannot tell. Certain it is, that the verb Leȝan is here all of a ſudden transformed into Leoȝan; in conſequence of which, its alliance with the affix Leaȝ becomes unqueſtionable. But Leoȝan ſignifies *perdere*, and is the ſame verb with the Engliſh to *Loſe*..... Oh, we cannot help

help that, you'll ſay. We have proved Leaſ to be the imperative of it, and that's ſufficient.

You add in a note *, It is the ſame imperative LES, placed at the end of nouns, and coaleſcing with them, which has given to our language ſuch adjectives as HOPELESS, RESTLESS, DEATHLESS, MOTIONLESS.

Theſe words have been all along conſidered as compounds of *Hope*, *Reſt*, &c. and the adjective *Leſs*, Anglo-Saxon Leaſ †, and Dutch Loos: and this explanation is ſo natural, ſo clear and ſatisfactory, that it is inconceivable how a man, who has any notion of neatneſs and conſiſtency in etymological diſquiſitions, could ever think of their being compounds of a noun, and the imperative of the verb Leſan. LEAS and Loos are ſtill extant, this in the Dutch, and that in the Anglo-Saxon language; and both anſwer to the Latin *ſolutus* in this phraſe *ſolutus cura*. So that *hopeleſs*, in the literal ſenſe of the word, only means *void of hope*; *faithleſs*, *void of faith*; a ſenſe ſo obvious, and ſo analogous to that which we mean to expreſs when we uſe theſe words, that nothing but love of novelty in the extreme could induce you to reject it, in order to make room for the uncouth and awkward expreſſions, *Hope-diſmiſs*, *Death-diſmiſs*

* P. 126.

† Multa (adjectiva) formantur ex ſubſtantivis addendo affixum negativum Leaſ, vel Leaſe, ut ꝑeccleaſ *negligens*; ꝛcommeleaſ, *impudens*; ęzcleaſ, *impavidus*; ꝛacleaſ *ſine culpa*. Hinc apud nos *careleſſe*, *fatherleſſe*, *motherleſſe*, *friendleſſe*, *harmleſſe*, & ſimilia. Sciendum vero eſt leaſ Anglo-Saxonicum deduci a M. Gothico Lans, quod ſignificat *liber*, *ſolutus*, *vacuus*, & in compoſitione privationem vel defectum denotat. Hickes's Angl. Sax. Gram. IV. §. III.

Where,

Where, in the name of wonder, have you ever found words tacked together in this manner?

In all languages, as far as we know, which admit of compoſition in words, there is a certain manner which muſt be attended to, before we preſume to make compounds; a manner in the arrangement; and a manner in the choice of thoſe words which are to be joined together. Some are to be conſidered as prefixes, others as affixes; ſome will not coaleſce; ſome, on the contrary, run into compoſition, as it were, of themſelves. In this part of the ſtructure, therefore, as well as in all the others, there is a kind of harmony, which muſt be attended to, and ſerve as a rule. To take words at random, and to jumble them together,

ut nec pes, nec caput,
Uni reddatur formæ,

is to violate that harmony: and this you do, when you tack an imperative to a noun for the purpoſe of making but one word of the two. This is a barbariſm of the firſt magnitude, I will not ſay in the Greek or Latin, but even in the leſs poliſhed languages. The French and the Engliſh have, indeed, their compounds of imperative and noun, but never of noun and imperative. I mean, that, when ſuch compoſition takes place with them, the imperative is conſtantly placed before the noun *. But, ſuppoſing

* *Un coupe-jarret*, a banditto; *un-boute-feu*, an incendiary; *un tire bouchon*, a cork-ſcrew. So in Engliſh, *a cut-purſe*, *a catch-penny*, &c. We ſay, indeed, *a tooth-pick*; but this is evidently corrupt from *tooth-picker*.

it

it was not, neither the French nor the modern Engliſh are, in that reſpect, a proper ſtandard whereby we can determine the genius of the old language. Not the French, becauſe it has little or no affinity with it; nor the Engliſh, becauſe it leaves here its original and more forcible manner, to adopt that of her rival. The Dutch, as it has preſerved to this day the Anglo-Saxon manner of compoſition, and admits of no other whatever, is undeniably the better rule to follow on this occaſion. But there are no compounds of the French kind juſt mentioned to be met with in that language: and as to thoſe you here obtrude on your readers, nothing can be more repugnant to its true nature and genius; a ſtrong reaſon to believe that they are not admiſſible in the Anglo-Saxon; and indeed, if they were, the compoſition would not have been confined to one ſingle inſtance. More verbs than one would have had their imperatives affixed to nouns, in order to make compounds with them. You would not have failed to quote a few inſtances where this kind of compoſition takes place; and we ſhould have had ſomething more than your bare word, by which to regulate our belief in this particular.

I have not done yet with *hope-diſmiſs* and *faith-diſmiſs*; I beg leave to add one objection more to that manner of compoſition in language. If, as you contend, *Loos* be the imperative of *Loſſen* in Dutch, how comes the noun prefixed to the imperative to terminate with an E, which is the conſtant and invariable ſign of the ablative caſe? They write and pronounce, *vrugteloos*, fruitleſs; *godeloos*, impious; *ſinneloos*,

*ſinneloos*, ſenſeleſs; *luſteloos*, liſtleſs. If *Loos* were an active verb, they would write and pronounce *vrugt-loos*, *godloos*, *ſinloos*, *luſtloos*, which is the form of the accuſative.

As it is expected you ſhould advance ſomething in defence of your new-fangled compounds, you make two efforts for that purpoſe, but both ſo feeble and ill-directed, that neither of them makes the leaſt impreſſion.

With this view you ſay, *I think, however, there will be little doubt about this derivation, when it is obſerved, that we ſay indifferently either ſleepleſs or without ſleep*, &c. i. e. *Diſmiſs ſleep*, or *Be out ſleep. So for thoſe words where we have not by habit made the coaleſcence, as the Daniſh Folkelös and Halelös, we ſay in Engliſh, withot people, without tail.*

We ſay indifferently either *ſleepleſs* or *without ſleep*. Ergo, there can be little doubt of LESS being the imperative of the verb Leȝan, &c. Can there be any thing more prepoſterous than the ſtreſs you lay upon ſuch arguments? and who but a man infatuated with the love of ſingularity would produce them?

You add, *it is obſervable, that*, IN ALL NORTHERN LANGUAGES, *the termination of this adjective in each language varies juſt as the correſpondent verb, whoſe imperative it is, varies in that language.*—After which comes an exhibition of the verb Leoȝan in no leſs than ſix different languages*. But here again you ſuffer

* As this exhibition is rather curious, I ſhall ſubmit it to the inſpection of the reader.

Goth

ſuffer yourſelf to be carried away by your favourite ſyſtem, ſo far as to venture upon ground where you can do nothing but expoſe your want of ſkill. I do not know the Swediſh, nor the Daniſh, nor the Gothic. But I know enough of the Dutch to affirm, without fear of being miſtaken, that the imperative of the verb LOSSEN is Loss, and not Loos, as you put it. Nor can you plead here the negligence of the printer, as no other imperative ſuited your purpoſe ſo well as Loos. And as I find you ſo often and ſo egregiouſly tripping in one of the ſix languages you here appeal to, how can I depend upon what you affirm of the others?

I cannot help taking notice here of the very extraordinary ſentence you have been pleaſed to paſs upon Johnſon's Dictionary; a work which, now for many years, has been a kind of ſtandard, by which even the moſt judicious, have aſcertained the ſignification of words in the Engliſh language, and which therefore ought not to be depreciated, without giving weighty reaſons for ſo doing. It has, no doubt, its blemiſhes: but they are not of the kind, *quas incuria fudit*. On the contrary, they may be called the reſult of the oppo-

| | Termination. | Infinite of the verb. |
|---|---|---|
| Goth . . . . | λλNS . . . . | λλNSÇλN. |
| Anglo Saxon . | Leaſ . . . . | Leoſan. |
| Dutch . . . . | Loos . . . . | Loſſen. |
| German . . . | Los . . . . | Löſen. |
| Daniſh . . . | Lös . . . . | Löſer. |
| Swediſh . . . | Lŏs . . . . | Lŏſa. |

Div. of Purley, p. 218.

N. B. It is in this table the Anglo-Saxon verb Leſan, *ſolvere*, is transformed into Leoſan, which has been noticed before.

ſite

ſite cauſe, too much nicety and exactneſs. Had the author been leſs minute in diſtinguiſhing the various ſignifications of words, he would have ſaved himſelf a great deal of trouble, and his work would not have been the worſe for it. As it is, we have nothing better of the kind. The explanations are commonly juſt and clear; the quotations numerous, and from the beſt authorities: which inclines me to believe, that when you ſtigmatize it *as a moſt contemptible performance, a reproach to the Engliſh nation, one third of it being as much the language of the Hottentots as of the Engliſh*; you mean only to animadvert on ſuch of the Doctor's definitions, diviſions, and derivations, as do not perfectly coincide with your manner of diſpatching that buſineſs. I am the more willing to make this ſuppoſition, as you do not enter into particulars; and as there is perhaps no point in which the Doctor differs more eſſentially from you, than in the etymologies to be aſſigned to Engliſh particles.

Your mentioning the Hottentots, in a paſſage I have juſt quoted from you, puts me in mind of your very curious table of Anglo-Saxon verbs *; one third of which, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, are of your own hatching, and ſome of them ſo cruelly mangled in the hatching, that they have not a limb left entire and in its place.

Beon-utan! Fyndan-utan! Mercy upon you for having found ſo much fault with others!

Non Dî, non homines, non conceſſere columnæ!

Why man, there is not a greater adulterator of lan-

* P. 185.

guage

guages than you in the world; and never did Mr. Champante, the Amſterdam ſealing-wax maker in London, violate in a more flagitious manner the purity of the Belgic Dame in his Dutch mottos *, than you that of the Anglo-Saxon in your table.

UTAN, according to the common way of thinking, is put down in the dictionaries as being both an adverb and a prepoſition; but, whatever you pleaſe to make of it, in neither of theſe capacities can it be joined to the verb in the manner you have done, without violating the moſt obvious rules for the arrangement of words in the Anglo-Saxon langnage; not as an adverb, becauſe, though a word of this denomination is added to a verb in order to expreſs the circumſtance of the matter in queſtion, yet it cannot coaleſce ſo as to make a compound word with it; nor as a prepoſition, becauſe, when this part of ſpeech is to make a compound with a verb, though in other moods it is occaſionally made to follow, yet, in the infinitive, it is conſtantly made to precede it †, and to write anÿban-utan, aſculan-utan, aſleapan-utan,

* *Wel brand en vaſt houd.*

† In the German, Dutch, and Anglo-Saxon, the rule is this: in compounds of verb and prepoſition, the prepoſition is always prefixed to the verb in the infinitive, as in unleſan, *ſolvere*, Foſtneadan *conculeare*, Inlædan *introducere*: but, in other moods, ſome of the prepoſitions may be put after it; and this is the caſe, for inſtance, with the prepoſitions up and ute.

| Infinit. | Præt. | Imperat. |
|---|---|---|
| Upſtandan | ic upſtod, or ſtod up | ſtand up |
| Utſittan | ic utſæt, or ic ſæt ute | ſitt ute. |

For want of having attended to this rule, the Editors of Lye's Dictionary

utan, inſtead of utanẏðan, utaſcutan, utaſtean, is as bad as to write in Latin *Pellere-ex*, inſtead of *Expellere*.

But I go farther: I doubt whether the Anglo-Saxon verb Weoꞃðan be ſuſceptible of the compound form you here give it, and I have two reaſons for my doubts; 1. I am certain the Dutch WORDEN is not; 2. Both in this language and in the Anglo-Saxon it anſwers to the Latin FIERI; to the French DEVENIR, and to the Engliſh TO BECOME, TO HAPPEN. It is joined to paſſive particles to expreſs the paſſive voice; but ſo as to repreſent, at leaſt in the preſent and imperfect, what is, or what was doing, and not what is, or was done. Ƿeoꞃþað beꞃeoꞃðe oꞃ ælcꞃe aꞃe. *Privabantur omni dignitate.* Ðaꞇ hi anꞃeðe þeoꞃðan, ⁊ Goðeſ ꞃiꝫꞇ luꞃian. *Ut concordes fiant & Dei juſtitiam ament.*

Similar to Ƿeoꞃðan-uꞇan, and Beon-uꞇan, is Anan-að in your table: a verb not likely to make

Dictionary have thought themſelves authoriſed to put the prepoſition laſt in the infinitive mood of ſuch verbs as they have found occaſionally ſeparated from it, when the mood will admit of that arrangement, and have by that means made, as it were, a ſeparate order of verbs of them. So in the prepoſition uꞇ, they put aðꞃiꞃan uꞇ, Ƿuꞃþan uꞇ, oꞃſlean uꞇ, an arrangement which cauſes one and the ſame verb, in more than one inſtance, to appear twice, i. e. once in the article of the prepoſition, and again in that of the verb itſelf; which is the caſe, for inſtance, in the verbs uꞇaðꞃiꞃan and uꞇlæꞇan. However, when they allow themſelves that liberty, they keep the verb and prepoſition ſeparate. The fancy of joining them together, ſo that the prepoſition comes laſt, and makes, notwithſtanding, a compound with the verb, is entirely the Author's.

its way in the world, as it conſiſts of ſuch heterogeneous parts as never were put together, and labours under many more unfavourable circumſtances. The conjunction AND is, you ſay, the imperative of Anan-aƀ, and conſequently its literal meaning is, *Da congeriem.* I wiſh to tranſlate *Da congeriem* into Engliſh, or French, or Dutch; but whether from ſlowneſs of apprehenſion, or from a real impoſſibility, in none of theſe languages can I find an expreſſion adequate to the purpoſe. And how *Da congeriem* can ever be accoutred with the wings of Mercury, ſo as to paſs currently for one of your ἔπεα πτερόεντα, *or winged words*, is to me incomprehenſible. Leaving you, therefore, to manage that buſineſs, I ſhall only obſerve, that, in my opinion, AND is the imperative of the Dano-Saxon, or rather Franco-theotiſc verb, *Andan Spirare*, from *Anda Spiritus*; and means ſimply *Draw your breath*; that is, *Stop, pauſe a moment, Sir.* And ſhould you aſk, from whence I have my intelligence concerning the verb Anƀan, my anſwer will be, from the ſame quarter which furniſhed you with Anan-aƀ, *dare congeriem* *. I now proceed to

EKE, where I ſhall have occaſion to notice another kind of miſtake, into which you are very apt to fall.

* The fact is, that we know very little of the origin of AND: it lies moſt likely buried in the ruins of ſome ancient language, of which we do not know ſo much as the name. The learned Hickes ſays, that "AND, in the Franco-theothiſc, *Ande*, *Endi*, *Inte*, *Int*, "*Unde*, *Und*, is a prepoſition among the Goths, anſwering to the "Latin *In*, *Coram*, *Contra*, *Adverſus*: and that ſo it comes to be a "prefix to ſo many nouns and verbs in the Anglo-Saxon to make "with them a compound." Gram. Anglo-Sax. Cap. xiv. §. 37. This is the whole that can be ſaid with any certainty of AND.

You

You obſerve, that the conjunction in Dutch is OOK, from the verb OOKEN; and in German AUCH, from the verb AUCHEN. I have converſed frequently in Dutch—I have read many Dutch authors—but neither in books nor converſation do I remember ever to have met with this verb OOKEN; nor is it to be found either in Sewel's or Halma's Dictionary. With regard to the German AUCHEN, all I can ſay is, that it is not to be found in the Dictionaries I have conſulted, among which is Adeling's Wörterbuch, allowed to be the beſt of all. You have here, however, the authority of Junius, who puts down theſe verbs as being the origin, the one of *Auch*, the other of *Ook*; but, I have your's to ſay, that he was ſometimes very careleſs and ignorant; and to add the following moral reflexion, which I find ready cut and dried in one of your pages: *How eaſily do men take upon truſt, how willingly are they ſatisfied with, and how confidently do they repeat after others, falſe explanations of what they do not underſtand!*

I ſee we have not done yet with the imperative of the verb Aleſan. ELSE; formerly written ALLES, ALYS, ALYSE, ELLES, ELLUS, ELLIS, ELLS, ELS, and now ELSE, is no other, in your opinion, than the imperative *Ales* or *Alys*, of *Aleſan* or *Alyſan* dimittere. As my taſte for the Anglo-Saxon has never induced me to attend to the various ſpellings of one and the ſame word in the language, I ſhould think myſelf ridiculous were I to contradict you with regard to the various ways of writing the word ELSE. I ſhall only remark, that had your quotations (by which you mean, I ſuppoſe, to prove the truth of what you

advance) been in favour of *Alys*, or *Alyſe*, inſtead of *Alles*, they would have been more to the purpoſe, as the two former come nearer to the imperative in queſtion than the latter.

This miſtake, however, can make no great difference with regard to the ſum total of the credit you are likely to gain by this new diſcovery. It is evident, that all theſe different readings of the word ELSE are reſolvable into one and the ſame ſound, viz. that which is expreſſed by ELLES. And as this is the form in which the Anglo-Saxon word for ELSE makes its appearance generally, I ſhall take it for granted that it is the original one, and with the more confidence, as it has been given to it by Skinner, Minſhew, and Johnſon. Theſe authors agree in deriving it from the Greek ἄλλως, or the Latin ALIAS: perhaps they are miſtaken in doing ſo. There is, indeed, as much reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Greeks and Latins borrowed the word from the Germans, as that theſe borrowed it from them; but that they had it in common will hardly be conteſted by thoſe who attend a moment to the ſimilarity of the ſound and the ſenſe in each of theſe languages; and conſider, at the ſame time, the number of words, both in the Greek and the Latin, avowedly of German extraction, or at leaſt of the ſame origin with their collaterals in the German language.

You will ſay that, notwithſtanding what has been alledged, your hypotheſis is ſtill as good as that of Skinner and Minſhew, as both are grounded on conjecture only. But I cannot allow the derivation of ELSE from, or its alliance at leaſt with, the Greek

and Latin correſponding words to be a mere conjecture, as it is ſupported by fact. Æl or El, in the ſenſe of ἄλλως, or *alias*, is ſtill extant in the Anglo-Saxon language; and there are traces of it not leſs evident in the Dutch and Daniſh. The firſt part of this aſſertion is grounded on the following words, Ælcon, *alias* Ælþeod, or Æl-þeodiȝ, *alienus peregrinus*, to be found in any Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. The ſecond in the Dutch word Elders, and the Daniſh Ellers, ſignifying, both of them, *Elſewhere*. In both El ſeems the radical word, and Ers only a termination, perhaps that of the genitive caſe, in order to expreſs a circumſtance of time, place, or manner. Al and El may then be ſaid to convey the ſame idea as the Greek ἄλλως, and the Latin *Aliàs*; and if ſo, why ſhould we have recourſe to the verb aleſan to find their origin? I have already obſerved, that it is not ſuſceptible of the ſignification you have all along affixed to it as its primary one; but let us ſuppoſe it to ſignify *to diſmiſs*, and nothing beſides; we ſhall find many phraſes in which Else will hardly bear to be reſolved into *hoc diſmiſſo*; witneſs the following, *Nothing Elſe*, *how Elſe*, *what Elſe*, *where Elſe*.

That, Though, in the Engliſh, Ðeah, in the Anglo-Saxon, and Doch, in the Dutch, are one and the ſame word, ſignifying one and the ſame thing; and that there is ſuch a verb as Ðaſian, or Ðaſiȝan, in the ancient language, is unqueſtionable. But that the firſt mentioned words are the imperative of the verb Ðaſian, or Ðaſiȝan, is not quite ſo clear. Though, indeed, is pronounced by ſome Thaf,

THAUF, or THOF, and by others THO'. But if we ſuppoſe (and it is very natural, and even neceſſary, to ſuppoſe it) that THOUGH had originally a guttural ſound at the end (as it ſtill has in the Dutch, and probably in the Daniſh), the above-mentioned pronunciation may be accounted for from other circumſtances beſides that which you imagine. It is well known, that in words which have gutturals, and are common to the Engliſh and Dutch language, that ſound is either dropped in the Engliſh, or changed into that of F: thus, *Nacht* and *Light* are pronounced *Nite, Light*; and *Genoeg, Kuch Sacht, Enouf, Couf, Soft,* in Engliſh. This true and fair repreſentation of the matter, if it do not abſolutely ſuperſede your derivation of *Though*, renders it at leaſt very uncertain. But I have ſomething beſides to alledge againſt it.

The true Anglo-Saxon word for THOUGH is Ðeah. For what reaſon this word is kept out of ſight by you, I do not know: it is certain, however, that if it be an imperative, it is not that of the verb Ðaƿian, or Ðaƿiȝan, which is Ðaƿ, or Ðaƿiȝ. You would perſuade us, indeed, that this is the form THOUGH ſtill aſſumes in the provincial pronunciation of it; but we have ſeen what dependence can be had upon this aſſertion. As Ðeah cannot be called the imperative of Ðaƿian; ſo neither can *Doch*, in Dutch, paſs for the imperative *Doogen*, or *Gedoogen*, in that language. As well might one ſay, that FED in Engliſh is the imperative of *Feed*; *Rat* of *Rate*; *Bit* of *Bite*. Not to mention, that it is frequently added to imperatives, to urge in a particular manner the thing

in

in queſtion. As, *Laat toch, toe, Suffer me*, or *Permit me, I beſeech you.* In which caſe, *toch* ſeparates the verb from its affix, which it could not do, if it were an imperative.

In your next article * you repreſent *Bot* and *But* as having been originally, that is, in the Anglo-Saxon, two words very different in origin, as well as ſignification. Would you be ſo obliging, Sir, as to let us know, in what Anglo-Saxon author one is likely to ſee this nice diſtinction obſerved, ſo as to be convinced of its reality? You quote, indeed, Chaucer and Gawin Douglas; and, leſt the quality ſhould be conteſted, you endeavour to make it up in quantity, having adduced no leſs than twenty paſſages from the latter, who, it ſhould ſeem, favours your opinion, and has given you a handle to palm it upon others. But on what ground can he be called, I will not ſay, an original, but an Anglo-Saxon writer? I apprehend, that neither he, nor Chaucer who lived an hundred years before him, will paſs for one of the number among thoſe who conſider how much the language had been vitiated at the time they lived, by the importation of foreign words †. Skinner taxes the laſt-mentioned of the two to have imported whole cart-loads of them; you will give me leave, therefore, to ſuſpend my judgement on this your obſervation, till you can produce ſome better authority for it.

I have my doubts alſo with regard to the origin

* P. 232. † See Johnſon's Preface, Art. Chaucer.

you aſſign to *Bot*, ſuppoſing it to be a word really exiſting in the language.

The imperative mood, indeed, has ever been a great favourite with human nature, at leaſt ſo far as it has the diſpoſal of it. From the monarch to the mule-driver; from the burgomaſter to the maſter of the treckſchuyt; or, if you do not like profane examples, from the dean to the verger, men are fond of it; and there is no doubt, but, as ſoon as they were able to uſe moods in any way, this was the firſt they put in practice. No wonder, therefore, if ſome who are wiſhing for reputation in the etymological career, but apt to graſp at the laurel before it is within their reach, ſhould, when they meet with words of an obſcure and dubious caſt, exclaim without heſitation, "An Imperative! An Imperative!" Aye, aye, men had never any objection to imperatives for their own uſe.

No wonder alſo, if you who have undertaken to explain the moſt difficult part of the language, ſhould indulge in the ſame fancy, and call out upon every occaſion, "An Imperative; no other than an Impe-"rative!" But what ſurprizes me, is the readineſs with which you find at once both an infinitive to your imperatives, and a ſenſe to your infinitives, which ſuits to a hair the purpoſe in queſtion.

But, you ſay, *is corruptly put for* Bot; *and the latter is the imperative of Botan*; i. e. *to ſuperadd, to ſubſtitute, to atone for, to compenſate with, to make amends with, to add ſomething more in order to make up a deficiency in ſomething elſe* *. And you add in a

* P. 244 and 250.

note,

note, *Johnſon and others have miſtaken the expreſſion,* TO BOOT, *(which ſtill remains in our language) for a ſubſtantive, which is indeed the infinitive of the ſame verb, of which the conjunction is the imperative; as the Dutch alſo ſtill retain* BOETEN *in their language with the ſame meaning.* The compoſure with which you advance your paradoxes, is, indeed, admirable.

As I cannot boaſt of having read all the Anglo-Saxon books and manuſcripts to be found on this our hemiſphere, it would be improper to tell you that I never met the Anglo-Saxon verb BOTAN uſed in the ſenſe you are pleaſed to give it, viz. TO SUPERADD, TO SUBSTITUTE: I ſhall only obſerve, that it is not to be found, at leaſt not in the ſenſe here in queſtion, in Somner's or Lye's Dictionaries, or Benſon's Treaſure; and as you appeal to the verb BOETEN in Dutch, and mention it as having the ſame meaning which you ſuppoſe BOTAN to have, I muſt beg leave to add, that the Dutch verb ſignifies *to make amends, to ſatisfy, to atone for,* and never *to ſuperadd.* Dr. Johnſon has alſo ventured to give us his ſentiments with regard to the Anglo-Saxon verb Butan *; and, more cautious than you are in general, he has confirmed it with proper authority. The following are his words: BOTAN, *to repent, to compenſate:* as,

*He is wis that bit and bote,*
*And bet biforen dome.*

If he be right (and there is great reaſon to believe he is) BOTAN in the Anglo-Saxon is exactly the ſame verb, in point of ſignification, as the Dutch BOETEN.

* See his Dictionary in the word, TO BOOT.

To

To this laſt verb is allied the noun BOETE, PENANEE, PENALTY, FINE, ſays Sewell; and to the Anglo-Saxon BOTAN is allied BOT, *recompenſe*, ſays Johnſon very properly, *or fine paid by way of expiation.* BOETE and BOT may very ſafely, therefore, be taken for the ſame word. To BOTE in the Anglo-Saxon is applied properly to what is paid or done by way of making amends for an offence; and thence, in a ſecondary ſignification, to what is paid or done in addition to the value offered or received between two contracting parties: in which ſenſe it anſwers to the common expreſſion in Engliſh, *into the bargain*; and to the French, *Par deſſus le marché.* And as theſe expreſſions may be extended, in both languages, to whatever exceeds, either in ſpeaking or acting, the object firſt in view; ſo the Anglo-Saxon TO BOTE takes a greater or a leſs latitude of ſignification, as occaſion requires. I ſhall give, for example, a paſſage borrowed from Somner, and tranſlated for the purpoſe into Engliſh and French.

Ang. Sax. Oft he to bote halde gecpedon þ hie ðeȝ piȝeȝ piȝh te ne pohton.

Lat. *Sæpe inſuper ei audacter dixerunt, ſe victorem nihili facere.*

Eng. *They told him into the bargain, more than once, and boldly, that they regarded not the conqueror.*

French. *Ils lui dirent par deſſus le marché, & cela avec hardieſſe & à différentes repriſes qu'ils n'avoient pour le vainqueur que du mépris.*

I uſe here the words *into the bargain*, and *par deſſus le marché*, not becauſe I think them elegant expreſſions, but becauſe they are the beſt to render the ſenſe

enſe of the Anglo-Saxon word *to bote*; and prove evidently that words may, in a remote ſignification, convey an idea no ways connected with the primary ſignification of the root from which they ſpring.

If any one were to tell you that BARGAIN in Engliſh, MARCHE, in French, and INSUPER in the Latin, in conſequence of the meaning they here aſſume, are all deſcended from verbs, the primary ſignification of which is to SUPERADD, or SUBSTITUTE, would you not think this a ſtrange way of reaſoning? Now I am deſirous to know what ground you have to go upon with regard to the ſignification of the Anglo-Saxon verb BOTAN. It can be no other than this: To BOTE, if not the verb BUTAN itſelf, is nearly related to it. To BOTE, Anglo-Saxon, is the ſame word as TO BOOT in Engliſh, and ſignifies *inſuper*; ergo, *Butan* ſignifies to SUPERADD, or SUBSTITUTE! Armed with ſome ſuch argument, it is pleaſant to hear you paſs the following ſentence. *Johnſon and others have miſtaken the expreſſion* TO BOOT *for a ſubſtantive, which is indeed the infinitive of the ſame verb of which the conjunction is the imperative.* Permit me to ſay, there is not the leaſt ground for this ſtricture. BOOT is evidently the ſame word with the Dutch BOETE, and differs from it in the ſpelling only. BOETE, to my certain knowledge, is not a verb, but a ſubſtantive. TO BOTE, Anglo Saxon, moreover, cannot be an infinitive; becauſe no words coming under that denomination are likely any more in the Anglo-Saxon than in the Dutch to end in OTE, or any termination exhibiting a conſonant between two vowels; but it may be a ſubſtantive; and that it

actually

actually belongs to this claſs is evident, from the inflexion it undergoes in conſequence of the prepoſition being prefixed to it. This inflexion is the E at the end of it, the invariable mark in the Anglo-Saxon of an oblique caſe in nouns of that caſt. All nouns maſculine in that language, ending their nominative with a conſonant, take E in the dative or ablative: GOD, GODE; ENGEL, ENGELE; GROUND, GROUNDE. Ða cþæð Zacchaþiaſ to þam engele, &c. Ða andſaþode him ſe engel. Ic eaom Gabþiel ic ſtande beſoþan Gode *.

I could quote more paſſages to prove my aſſertion; but as it is hardly poſſible to add any without being tireſome, I ſhall be permitted, I ſuppoſe, to come to the following inference.

There is great reaſon to believe that Johnſon and others have not miſtaken the expreſſion TO BOOT, when they called it a ſubſtantive; but that you were egregiouſly ſo, when you made an infinitive of it.

I am now come to the word BUT, in the ſenſe of WITHOUT, or the Latin NISI. You give it as your opinion, that it is a contraction of the Anglo-Saxon Bute, or Butan, and anſwers to the Dutch BUYTEN; and thus far I perfectly agree with you: but when you add BUTE, or BUTAN, is neither more nor leſs than BE OUT, i. e. an imperative of the verb utebeon, I beg leave to conſider a moment.

Se that hinne ſelve uorget.

. . . . . .

He ſal comen on euele ſtede
But Gode him be milde.

* See Specimen of Ancient Engliſh in Johnſon's Preface.

He

He who forgets himſelf ſhall come to an evil fate, Be out the Lord be merciful unto him.

There nis met bote frute
There nis halle bure no bench.
Bot water man is thurſt to quench.

There is no meat, be out fruit; no hall, no houſe, no bench: nothing be out water for a man his thirſt to quench.

As an imperative implies a command, and this a ſubject to whom it is given, the perſon who ſays, *Be out fruit, be out water,* muſt be ſuppoſed to give his orders to ſomebody. Now, unleſs we admit he is here addreſſing his own words, I confeſs I cannot ſee the ſubject to whom his ſpeech is directed. We ſay indeed, *Be it known, be it remembered*; but then, *to you,* or *by you,* is underſtood. We ſay, *If you come,* i. e. *give you come*; but there again the ſubject is viſible; however, let us not be too nice, we often hear of a man eating his words: why ſhould we not believe that a man can addreſs his words? the one is not more impoſſible than the other. If there be any real objection againſt your explanation of BUTE or BUTAN, it muſt be the following.

Numberleſs are the inſtances in which Be is employed as a prefix; and in others as a prepoſition in the ſenſe of CIRCA *juxta, per, in, ſecundum,* in the Anglo-Saxon, Dutch, or Engliſh. And unleſs we can aſſign a ſignification to it, which will make it one and the ſame word, whatever be its appearance, it matters not to name one which will ſuit only in this or that inſtance. For you ſay very properly, " *I do* " *not allow that any words change their nature, ſo as to*

" *belong*

"*belong ſometimes to one part of ſpeech, and ſometimes* "*to another, from the different ways of uſing them.*" Whatever, therefore, be that in which the word in queſtion is uſed, it muſt have one and the ſame form as well as meaning, when traced to its ſource. But if we look over the catalogue of words in an Engliſh or Dutch dictionary beginning with it, we ſhall hardly find one in twenty, nay, in an hundred, which will bear the ſuppoſition that its firſt component part is neither more nor leſs than the imperative BE, from the verb TO BE.

The field of conjecture is open to all; and whatever riches are diſcovered in it, they are the property of the diſcoverer, and he may reap the benefit of them without fear of ever becoming an object of cenſure or envy, provided he does not preſume to circulate them as ſterling. To indulge in fancies where we have little or no ground to go upon, is a harmleſs amuſement; but to proffer the reſult of our ſpeculations under thoſe circumſtances, as any thing which can be depended upon, is prepoſterous.

So many ages have elapſed ſince the Anglo-Saxon language firſt began to be diſtinguiſhed from any other, it continued for ſo long a ſpace of time to float in the mouths of ſavages and unſettled people, it underwent ſo many changes from the mixture of foreign idioms, that probably the rudiments from which it ſprang are for the moſt part loſt: and without theſe, it is impoſſible to trace the origin of every word that occurs in the language. It is but now and then we ſee a ray breaking through the clouds which

obſcure

obſcure this ſcene; but now and then we can make an obſervation.

We ſee enough, however, to fix our judgement with regard to the true nature of prepoſitions, conjunctions, and particles in general: ſome of them have ſo near a reſemblance to words conſidered as different from them, and ſtill remaining in the language, that it is more than probable both belonged formerly to one and the ſame claſs.—Ἄλλα, for inſtance, in the Greek language, called a conjunction, can be nothing but the noun ἄλλα, πράγματα being underſtood—ERGO, in the Latin, the dative or ablative caſe of the Greek noun ἔργον *—ON, in the French, the Italian noun *huom, or uom* †—NOT in Engliſh, and NIET in Dutch, compounds, the one of NE and OUGHT, and the other of NE and IET: this laſt word having the ſame ſignification as OUGHT in Engliſh.

I mention this explanation of the word NOT, becauſe it appears to be more natural and ſatisfactory than that which you have given of it, p. 512, of your Diverſions of Purley; where, after ſome ſtrictures on Greenwood's, Minſhew's, and Junius's derivation, you expreſs yourſelf on this ſubject in the following manner: *But we need not be any further inquiſitive,*

* See Sanctii Minerva de Vocibus Homonymis. L. IV.

† Il peccato per lo quale huom dice ch'io debbo, eſſera morte giudicato, io no'l commiſi giammai. Bocace.

Il ſonno veramente è com' uom dice,
Parente della morte.

Petrarque.

*nor,*

*nor, I think, doubtful, about the origin and ſignification of* NOT *and* NO, *ſince we find that in the Daniſh* NÖDIG, *and in the Swediſh* NÖDIG, *and in the Dutch* NOODE, NODE, *and* NO, *mean averſe, unwilling.*

Nothing can equal the inadvertence, to ſay no more, which you betray upon this occaſion. Had you beſtowed one ſingle thought upon the ſubject, you would not have put down No as a Dutch word; nor would you have called NOODE or NODE an adjective equivalent to NÖDIG in the Daniſh, and NÖDIG in the Swediſh, and having with them the ſignification of AVERSE, UNWILLING.

NOODE, in Dutch, is the dative or ablative caſe of NOOD, neceſſity; and is an abbreviation of UYT NOODE, *through neceſſity*. What is done through neceſſity, may be ſaid to be done unwillingly and with averſion. Theſe different expreſſions, therefore, are put down in the dictionaries as being equivalent, and the following phraſe, *Dat heb ick noode gedaan*, may be found there tranſlated, *I have done that unwillingly*. But does it follow that NOODE is an adjective ſignifying *unwilling, averſe?* As well might a Dutchman ſay that NECESSITY, in Engliſh, is a word of this claſs, having that ſignification, becauſe *I have done it through neceſſity*; is thus explained in his dictionary, I have done it, unwilling, or averſe, *Iik heb het engaarn gedaan.*

From the ſimilarity of the ſound and ſpelling, I ſhould ſuſpect *Nödig* in the Daniſh, and *Nodig* in the Swediſh, to be the ſame word with *Nodig* in Dutch; and, if ſo, its proper and primary ſignification is *Neceſſary*, and not that which you are pleaſed

to

to assign to it, *Unwilling*, *Averse*. And from this, and many other circumstances, I suspect, moreover, that your knowledge of the Swedish and Danish is of the same kind with that you possess of the Dutch—the mere result of some occasional inspection into the dictionary. Be that as it may, your derivation of NOT is absurd beyond measure; but, absurd as it is, you make it your finishing stroke. It is after this specimen of your etymological powers, you tell your reader, as if conscious of something, I do not know what, *I hope I shall be permitted to have done with etymology*; and so——you take your leave of him.

WITHOUT, *nothing but the imperative of* ƿyƿð-utan. To many this derivation may appear plausible; but not so to those who understand any thing of the Dutch or the German: they will tell you, that ƿeoƿðan will not coalesce with the prepositon UT or UTAN, so as to make a compound word with it, any more than EX with FIERI in Latin; OUT with *become* in English; and *hors* with *devenir* in French: they will tell you, moreover, that very different are the verbs BEON and WEORDAN; and that if, by saying the one is incorporated into the other, you mean that both have the same signification, you are utterly mistaken. But no more at present of WEORDAN-UTAN: it ought never to make its appearance but to be laughed at.

You accuse Hermes of having blinded philosophy; take care you do not commit a greater crime, possessed as you are with the rage of stuffing the language with words repugnant to its nature; take care you do not poison the hallowed springs at which the English Muse delights to drink: the limpid stream may

ſoon loſe its purity, if the courſe of it be altered. You tell us, that thoſe who have no coaches muſt ride in ſledges: but in your way there is no riding at all, not even upon a ſtick; and if the rude forefather of the hamlet had no other way of communicating thought than that you mention, he muſt have felt happy whenever he could keep his thoughts to himſelf, as by that means he eſcaped a hooting.

1. Aſs be out a crupper.
2. Man join a noſe.
3. Figs come beginning Turkey.

This is the way in which he expreſſed himſelf when, in the firſt inſtance, he wiſhed to ſay, *An aſs without a crupper*; in the ſecond, *A man with a noſe*; in the third, *Figs come from Turkey* *. It is very well he is gone; had he lived to the preſent wicked age, he muſt have had a bad time of it.

* FROM, *you* ſay, p. 374, *means merely* BEGINNING, *and nothing elſe; and immediately after you add*, it is ſimply the Anglo-Saxon or Gothic word FRUM, *beginning, origin, ſource, fountain, author*. Ergo, ſome will ſay, it means ſomething more than *beginning*. But I will not dwell upon this inference. There certainly is ſuch a word as *Frum*, *Frim*, or *Fram*, in the ancient language; and among the ſignifications affixed to it by Lye, is that you mention; but by the uncouth, unmeaning interpoſition of it in *Figs come beginning Turkey*, one would naturally imagine, that either the primary ſignification of it is loſt, or that the expreſſion is elliptical, and wants ſome intermediate word or words to fill up the chaſm. It ſeems, indeed, a difficult matter to ſay any thing rational concerning the particular drift, not only of this, but of many more words without having recourſe to one of theſe ſuppoſitions. *Frym* and *From* are very likely allied to *Form*, *Forma*. *Primus*, and it is not improbable, that both are derived from the word *For*, originally a noun; but what the original meaning of that word is cannot be aſcertained.

Junius,

Junius, Skinner, Wallis, Johnſon, and Lowth, all concur in deriving LEST (a conjunction) from LEAST (adjective). You are very poſitive it is not derived from it: "*I will venture to affirm*, ſay you, *that* LEST, "*for* LESED, *is nothing elſe than the imperative of* "LESAN *dimittere*; *and, with the article* THAT, *either* "*expreſſed, or underſtood, means no more than hoc* "*dimiſſo*, or *quo dimiſſo*."

And I alſo will venture to affirm ſomething, which is, that there is great reaſon to reject, on this occaſion, if not your hypotheſis, at leaſt the confidence with which it is delivered; and if my aſſertion prove true, *it will furniſh one caution more to learned critics*, (I give your own words), *not to innovate raſhly: leſt, while they attempt to amend a language, as they imagine, in one trifling reſpect, they mar it in another of more importance; and, by their corrupt alterations and amendments, confirm errors, and make truth more difficult to be diſcovered by thoſe who come after them.*

BETAAL * is a very common word among the Dutch; it is generally the firſt one hears when one lands any where in their country; and truly the Engliſh are not much behind hand with them in the uſe of its equivalent. For ſince they obſerved, that by urging it frequently their neighbours grew fat and luſty, and ſufficiently ſtrong to meddle with other people's things without aſking leave, they alſo became fond of it; and the imperative LES, from the verb LEZAN, was no more common among the Anglo-Saxons, than the imperative mood of the verb to PAY is among your modern Engliſh: they uſe it even

* The imperative of BETAALEN, to pay.

in

in contracts of mutual civility, inſomuch, that when, on the one ſide, is to be given up a certain portion of judgement and belief, and, on the other, certain good reaſons for it, they will not give you a pennyworth of the firſt article, unleſs you *pay* them ten times the value.

In the name of wonder, will you ſay, what do you mean by this ſtrange digreſſion? It is intended, Sir, as a hint that your countrymen will not pin their faith upon your aſſertions, and pay you a compliment into the bargain, unleſs you ſhew cauſe why they ſhould do ſo.

On what ground does your etymology of the particle here in queſtion reſt, that you ſhould be ſo poſitive about it? LEST for LESED, ſay you, as BLEST for BLESSED. This is the whole of what you tender for our deference to your opinion; and, ſmall as the conſideration is, it is made up of bad coin.

LESAN and BLESSIAN cannot, whatever you may think of the matter, be coupled together, as belonging to one and the ſame order of verbs; the one has a ſingle, the other a double conſonant before the termination of the infinitive mood: that forms a long, this a ſhort ſyllable in the participle paſſive; and conſequently, though the latter will bear the contraction, it does not follow that the former will bear it likewiſe. And thus much for the bad coin with which you attempt to put us off.

Chillingworth ſays, no matter where, *You make uſe of ſuch indirect and crooked arts as theſe to blaſt my reputation, and to poſſeſs mens minds with diſaffection to my perſon, leſt peradventure they might, with ſome indifference,*

*difference, hear reaſon from me.* And the following is the turn you give this paſſage, in order to ſhew the juſtneſs and efficacy of *hoc dimiſſo.*

"*You make uſe of theſe arts.*" Why? the reaſon follows, *Leſed that*, i. e. *Hoc dimiſſo—Men might hear reaſon from me—Therefore you uſe theſe arts.*

Would any one imagine this curious aphoriſm to be intended as an explanation of the particle LEST, to ſhew at once, and clearly, what its origin and meaning are? It will require ſome quickneſs of apprehenſion to make it out in any given time whatever. But you are not the firſt who has made things, dark of themſelves, a little darker by endeavouring to explain them.

LEST, uſed as a conjunction, and attended by THAT, means, as you imagine, neither more nor leſs than *That being diſmiſſed or diſcharged, or laid aſide.* To give your explanation all the chance poſſible, let us not ſtand upon trifles; let us chooſe out of theſe three expreſſions that which is moſt favourable to it, namely, *laid aſide:* by uſing it inſtead of *Leſt*, in the above-mentioned paſſage, the whole will run as follows, *You make uſe of theſe arts,* LAID ASIDE THAT, *men might hear reaſon from me.* Now, though this conveyance for thought does not run quite ſo faſt as Engliſh conveyances do in general, yet, as it may very well be compared to a dray-cart, dragged by an heavy, flabby, flat-footed horſe, we will not deny it here the appellation of a conveyance for thought; we ſhall only take notice of the direction in which it moves.

I imagine, that when a man ſays, *You make uſe of*

*theſe arts, leſt men might hear reaſon from me,* theis expreſſion implies an apprehenſion in him that ſome thing may happen, and at the ſame time a ſtrong deſire to prevent it. And I am the more inclined to think ſo, as the French uſe upon this occaſion, *De peur que, De crainte que*; the Dutch, *Uyt vreeze dat*; and the Latins their emphatical NE *: expreſſions which all indicate clearly, that the above-mentioned circumſtances do actually take place upon this occaſion. But how can they be implied in this lame and inſipid phraſe, *You make uſe of theſe arts, laid aſide that, men might hear reaſon from me?* It barely declares that ſuch a thing may happen, and has no kind of tendency to expreſs a fear that it may happen, or a deſire to prevent it: LEST THAT, conſequently, muſt convey ſomething more than the bare idea of *quo* or *hoc dimiſſo:* and your ſledge, though we might put up with the ſlowneſs of its motion, yet, as it moves in a contrary direction to that which is intended, muſt be laid aſide in the preſent inſtance.

Dr. Johnſon gives us, in his dictionary, the following deduction of the word LEST.

LEST, *conjunction from the adjective* LEAST, *that not.* On this deduction of the Doctor you make the following remark: *This is a curious one indeed, and it would puzzle as ſagacious a reaſoner as Dr. Johnſon himſelf, to ſupply the middle ſtep to his concluſion, from*

* They ſay, indeed, *Cave putes, Cave credas*; but it is evident that NE is underſtood, and that even in this way of ſpeaking there is an ellipſis of *Ut*; and that the phraſe at full length is *Cave ut ne credas*; ſo Terence, *Ulciſcar ut ne impune in nos illuſeris*; and Tully, *Opera datur ut judicia ne fiant.*

LEAST *(which always, however, means ſomething)* to, THAT NOT, which means NONE AT ALL. I beg leave to make ſome remarks in my turn.

1. If there be any thing curious in the preſent caſe, it is your criticiſm on Dr. Johnſon's explanation, and your recommendation of *hoc dimiſſo*, or *quo dimiſſo*, in the room of it. From what has been already alledged againſt it, there is no great hope of *hoc dimiſſo*, or *quo dimiſſo*, ever making its way ſo as to get the ſtart of any explanation whatever; let us, however, compare them together, by trying their reſpective efficacy on the above-mentioned paſſage.

Dr. Johnſon's explanation of it is, *You make uſe of theſe arts*, THAT *men may* NOT *hear reaſon from me.*

Your improvement upon Dr. Johnſon is, *You make uſe of theſe arts.* Why? *the reaſon follows: Lezed that*, i. e. *Hoc dimiſſo—men may hear reaſon from me.*

Is it not aſtoniſhing that a man ſhould plume himſelf on having ſubſtituted this ſtrained and far-fetched manner of ſpeaking, for the eaſy and natural explanation which precedes? But ſay you,

2. LEAST always means ſomething, and Johnſon employs it as a mere negative. Quirks and quibbles, Sir, will not do in the ſearch after truth. When I hear it affirmed of a man, that he has friends no where, and leaſt of all at court, I ſhould be glad to know how many friends I may reaſonably ſuppoſe that man to have at court. Or, when I read in Latin, *Minime gentium, res minime mira, ſpectaculum mi-*

*nime gratum*; or thus, *Operam das ut minime meis obtemperent consiliis homines*; I should take it very kindly, if you would let me know what that something is which the word MINIME implies; because, when that is done, it will be an easy matter, not only to settle your dispute with Mr. Harris, about the manner of supplying the article in the Greek *, but, moreover, to adjust public matters so, as that there shall be no more discontented people, no more effusion of blood, and dismemberment of the empire.

3. LEST, in the sense of THAT NOT, or the NE emphaticum of the Latin, is generally written in the ancient language thus, LÆST; and what is more to the purpose, it is there preceded by the article THE or THY. Ƿapnoꝺe he hıne ð læſ hı on hpyle ꝛo hım ıneoꝺan. "Caverat ne in aliquam domum ad "se introirent †." þæꝛ hẏ ð ꝼolcꝼıhꝛ aꝼehꝛon þy læſ ænıȝ man cpeðe. That they common right should declare ‡ Ð læſ ꝼe ſpelꝛon, Ne moriamur §.— And as læſ is used also in the Anglo-Saxon for the comparative of lyꝛel, parvus, it is evident that þ læſ answers to the modern THE, or THAT LESS. þ læſꝛ to THAT LEAST, supple, OF ALL THINGS; and if so, it will require no great effort of genius to find out the middle step from LEST to THAT NOT; and you will do well to look for it yourself, as it will furnish you with an easy and natural explanation of the word

* See Diversions of Purley, p. 100.

† Bed. Hist. Eccles. Lib. I. cap. 21.

‡ Alfred's Will, p. 12.

§ Exod. xx. 19.

LEST,

LEST, and put you, perhaps, upon acknowledging, as I think you ought to do, that, in this, as well as in many other inſtances, you have been too precipitate in condemning Johnſon.

I have now gone over the greater part of your ſeventh chapter; and from the remarks I have made, there ariſes a ſtrong preſumption, that, if a few of your etymologies can bear examination, moſt of them cannot; being grounded on words, either not in the language, or not connected with thoſe of which they are ſuppoſed to be the origin. And having proceeded thus far, it will perhaps be expected that I ſhould go on, and extend my remarks to the remaining part of your work; but the exceptionable places being leſs numerous there than in the preceding chapters, and moſtly of the kind already noticed; ſo that in animadverting on them at large, it would hardly be poſſible to avoid repetitions; I ſhall content myſelf with a few general obſervations, and then conclude.

Notwithſtanding the unfavourable impreſſions I received from your manner of tracing the conjunctions to their origin, that is, to the primitive word in the language from which they ſpring; I muſt do you the juſtice to ſay, that I have read with pleaſure, and even with ſome advantage, your ninth and tenth chapters, which treat of prepoſitions and adverbs. The light in which you place theſe parts of ſpeech is new, and well calculated to turn the attention of the ſtudious in general from idle and endleſs ſubtleties,

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to the contemplation of truth, and acquiſition of real knowledge. Your deductions here are, upon the whole, the reverſe of what they were before; for, except ſuch as reſt upon ſuppoſed imperatives, they are in general plauſible, and many of them unexceptionable. In ſhort, I think this the beſt part of the work. I am more particularly pleaſed with the following reflexion *: *The explanation and etymology of theſe words require a degree of knowledge in all the ancient languages, and a degree of ſkill in the application of that knowledge, which I am very far from aſſuming.* After a ſentence ſo full of modeſty and diſcretion, ſo much to your honour, one is grieved to ſee you meddle with the *benedenſte lip, en enderſte lip,* and with *Spic-ſpan,* and *Spik-ſpelder.* O fie upon *Spic-ſpan* and *Spik-ſpelder* †.

As you ſeem to aim at ſome ſignal diſtinction in the etymological career, let me prevail upon you not to be too free with the Dutch. I know that any one

* P. 491.

† In Dutch they ſay, *Spik-ſpelder niew*, and *Spyker*, means a warehouſe, or a magazine; *Spil*, or *Spel*, means a ſpindle; *Schiet*, *Spoel*, the weaver's ſhuttle; and *Spoelder*, the ſhuttle thrower. In Dutch, therefore, *Spik ſpelder niew* means new from the warehouſe, or the loom, Div. of Parl. p. 508.

N. B. 1. Two points over a ſingle vowel not in uſe with regard to Dutch words. 2. *Spyker* means here a nail. 3. *Spel* for Spil, not in the Dutch language. 4. *Spoelder*, ditto. 5. *Spelder*, here an oblique caſe of *Spelde*, a pin ‡. 6. *Spoelder*, in the premiſſes, a ſhuttle-thrower; in the concluſion, a loom. Sum total of the faults in this article, Six.

‡ See Halma, in Spelde.

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is at liberty to mangle and torture it; but there are a thouſand reaſons why you ſhould not. For, not to mention that a man may be poſſeſſed of an uncommon ſhare of merit, both as a ſcholar and a gentleman, without knowing a word of it; this, like other languages, has its true and falſe currency; and though the miſtaking and tendering the one for the other is deemed but a ſlight offence in ſome; with regard to dealers in etymologies, it is reckoned a capital one. And as the field of glory lies open to you in ſo many places, why ſhould you attempt to enter it at one ſo dangerous?

Let me add another piece of advice, which you ſeem to be much in want of: when you are about ſome new diſcovery, take care not to dwell too long upon one and the ſame thing. It is well known, that by the continual preſſure of the ſame idea upon the mind, its operations are greatly impeded. I remember to have read ſomewhere of a Greek profeſſor, who, having made it out, as he thought, that the Greek language is the ſource of all the reſt; at every word he met with, whether in the German or French, Latin or Hebrew, would call out Vox Græca! and be as poſitive about it, in caſe of any demur, as brother Peter about his brown loaf. Though this caſe is by no means ſimiliar to yours, it puts one nevertheleſs in mind of your imperatives.

If you muſt put our gravity to the proof, by telling us that, *Man join noſe**; *Aſs be out crupper*; *figs*

* P. 348.

*beginning*

*beginning Turkey, and the like, are the true prototypes of a man with a noſe; an aſs without a crupper; figs from Turkey* *, &c. Well and good. We are ready to pay you the attention which is your due as a man of learning and genius. But be not too poſitive; and remember, that if, in delivering theſe ſentiments, we perceive the leaſt attempt, or even deſire, to paſs them upon us as articles of faith, we ſhall think ourſelves at liberty to relax in our attention, and turn into a jeſt what cannot be converted to any other uſe.

You make WITH, prepoſition as it is called, the imperative of WITHAN, ϒΙΦΛΝ †, *to join*. There is ſuch a verb in the ancient language, and from its ſignification, *conjugare, copulare*, it ſeems to bear ſome affinity to the verb WED in Engliſh, and pebian in the Anglo-Saxon. And thus far circumſtances ſeem to favour your derivation of WITH from WITHAN, *to join*; but others ſtrongly militate againſt it. 1. It is hardly poſſible to determine which is the root, ſuppoſing there is a real affinity betwixt WITH and WITHAN. 2. WITH often occurs in a ſenſe which does by no means accord with *conjugare* & *copulare*; as for inſtance, in the Engliſh, to WITHHOLD; the Dutch, *weederſpreeken*; the German, *widerſtehen*; and in many other words, it has the ſignification of the Latin particles CORAM, or ITERUM. But the moſt ugly circumſtance of all, in the preſent caſe,

* P. 185. p. 375. † P. 376.

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is your having ſomewhere elſe derived * the prepoſition WITH from the *ſoi-diſant* Anglo-Saxon ƿẏꞃðuꞇan. I very much fear that this will bring to the ground your conjecture about WITH from *withan*, to join, and that *man join noſe* muſt be given up as a loſt cauſe; unleſs indeed you can prove, as you attempt to do, that there is a fallacy in that prepoſition which few people are aware of; that, Proteus-like, it is ſometimes one thing, and ſometimes another; that in the following phraſes, WITH *miſchance*, WITH *miſadventure*, it means *be*, and is the imperative of ƿẏꞃðon; whereas in theſe, WITH *evil prefe*, WITH *harde grace*, it means JOIN, and comes from WITHAN, to join †. But this is a hard taſk indeed!

Truth, as you ſay, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer the ſurface. Had Mr. Harris and others, inſtead of diving deeper than they had occaſion, into Ariſtotelian myſteries, contented themſelves with obſerving plain facts; they would ſoon have perceived, that prepoſitions and conjunctions were nothing more than nouns and verbs in diſguiſe; and the chapter of the diſtribution and diviſion of language would have been ſettled and compleat long ago, to the contentment and joy of every body; whereas, in the way they pro-

* Mr. Tyrwhitt has obſerved truly, that BY and WITH are often ſynonymous; they are always ſo when WITH is the imperative of ƿẏꞃðan . . . . . But Mr. Tyrwhitt is miſtaken when he ſuppoſes WITH *evil prefe*, WITH *hard grace*, WITH *ſory grace*—to have the ſame meaning: for, in thoſe three inſtances, WITH is the imperative of ƿIψλN. Div. of Purl. p. 349. in a note.

† P. 349.

ceeded, their labour was immenſe, and the benefit equal to nothing.

Happy thoſe, who, in their endeavours to explain ſcience, are allowed to look behind the veil which conceals her from the common eye. Whatever be the object of their purſuit, if they are but allowed to contemplate it in its true light, and give ſuch information about it as has not been given yet; they think themſelves ſufficiently rewarded, and perſevere with joy in application.

To many the ſtudy of particles may ſeem unpleaſant and unprofitable; but it is neither. The happineſs which is felt by the Philoſopher, and that enjoyed by the Grammarian, are nearly on a par, provided both originate in the diſcovery of truth. As to the utility of it, though trifling in itſelf, it leads to things of the utmoſt conſequence; and the moſt dignified of all ſciences, Theology, often deigns to conſult her humble hand-maid, the ſcience of particles, the better to ſteer her way through the many difficulties which ſurround her *.

Profeſſor Schultens was the firſt philologiſt who ſuſpected prepoſitions, conjunctions, particles in general to be no more than nouns or verbs, and refuſed therefore to make ſeparate claſſes of them, among thoſe that comprehend the parts of ſpeech.

* Ac ne ipſa quidem, opinor omnium diſciplinarum regina, theologia ducet indignum admoveri ſibi manus ac debitum exhiberi officium a pediſequa grammatica: quæ tametſi nonnullis eſt poſterior dignitate, nullius certe opera magis neceſſaria. In minimis verſatur, ſed ſine quibus nemo evaſit maximus. Nugas agit, ſed quæ ad ſeria ducunt. Eraſmus Epiſt. Lib. IV. Ep. 7.

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But he confined himſelf in the application of this truth to the learned languages. You are the firſt who applied it to thoſe which are called modern. It would be wrong not to acknowledge, that in this you have rendered the literary world an important ſervice. For though you have not been allowed to proceed far in this career without frequent miſtakes, yet your progreſs through it has been ſufficiently marked with ſucceſs to put others upon making ſome further diſcoveries. That this may be the final reſult of your lucubrations, and that you may live to ſee your ſyſtem receive all the improvements of which it is ſuſceptible, is the ſincere wiſh of

Your moſt obedient ſervant,

I. CASSANDER.

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